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Preface
This study is an attempt to place in historical perspective the
failure of the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations to acknowledge
its accountability to the people of Namibia. This political, legal and
moral dispute involves more than the United Nations and South Africa
over the administration of Namibia; the case is an example of two revo-
lutionary movements which have dominated world politics in recent years
eradication of the last vestiges both of colonialism and of racial
discrimination.
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1CHAPTER I
A POLITICAL ANACHRONISM
A decade after the dissolution of colonial empires, Namibia is
still under colonial administration. Even among the colonies, Namibia
is an anachronism. Under the administration of Pretoria, it has steadily
become not more but less independent, and among Germany’s former posses-
sions, it is the only one in Africa, indeed anywhere, not to be placed
under the United Nations trusteeship system or to be advanced toward
independence. The world knows much more about the moral issues and
legal arguments which rage around Namibia than it does about the people
who live in the land. The population of Namibia is as heterogeneous as
that of any other African nation-state, including the Herero, Nama,
Berg-Damara, Ovurabo, Rehobother, Bushmen, and Colored, the non-whites,
the South African whites (English- and Afrikaans-speaking) , and also
Germans. In the wind of change which swept across Africa in the twenti-
eth century, bringing national independence and self-determination for
black Africans, dependent nations have won independence even without
economic viabilities and integrative mechanisms to coalesce the dis-
parate cultures into a national personality, because native Africans
still want franchised participation and a voice in their destinies.
The political, economic, and social systems of Namibia do not conform
to twentieth century standards of modern constitutional practice, the
majority rule.
"The division of Africa," wrote Ruth First, "was an extension
of the struggle among European powers of the 19th century, and Africa
2under colonialism was ruled as a promontory of European interests."
Colonialism was characterized by pacification, trade, and only the most
rudimentary form of administration until World War I. Those places where
the colonizing power met stiff resistance were dealt with by an unabated
ferocity. In all accounts, German colonial policy in Namibia was one of
extermination rather than a policy of a modus vlvendi with the tribal
chiefs to guarantee them administrative convenience like any other
colonial power.
South West Africa under the German rule . Missionary activity
preceded colonization in most of Africa. The British London Missionary
Society sent to South West Africa the German Heinrich Schmelen, who
established the first South West African Christian station. Generous as
this gesture was, it served the purpose of reducing tension and competi-
tion among various missionary groups. Industrial and farming colonies
were established to teach potential converts the value of hard work and
efficiency. Before too long, as is characteristic of colonial conditions,
both traders and missionaries involved themselves in intertribal politics
and internecine warfare.
Bi6mark, the reluctant colonizer, acceded to German nationalist
demands for colonial acquisitions in time to join the scramble for
Africa. A conference was convened in 1884-85 in Berlin during which
colonial powers reached an understanding to recognize one another's
rights in Africa. The declaration stipulated that "all governments
^uth First, The Barrel of a Gun (London: Allen Lane The Penguin
Press, 1970), p. 29.
3char# the wish to bring the nations of Africa within the pala of civiliza-
tion by opening up the interior of the continent to commerce, by furnish-
ing the natives with the means of instruction." Accordingly, the work
of the Rhenish Mission permeated deeply into the tribal life of the
South West African natives. The failure of German commercial activities
to generate any profit induced Bismark to dispatch an Imperial Commissioner,
Dr. Goring, to inveigle African chiefs of South West Africa into accept-
ing the protection of Germany. This is a conventional way in colonial
diplomacy of establishing protectorates and this is how South West
Africa became a German protectorate.
The wealth of the natives was their cattle and the land, but for
the settlers to live comfortably, they had to have land and cattle as
well. Before long the Herero tribe realized that loss of native land to
Europeans would endanger the survival of their cattle herds. The cattle
owned by the tribe constituted the basis of the ancestral cult and im-
plicitly of the whole system of chieftaincy. The natives repulsed German
social discrimination and the lack of impartiality of the German colonial
courts. There were no courts, but the police invariably took sides with
the traders and often "administered lashes to the complainant for his
insolence in suggesting that a white man could be anything but scrupu-
lously fair and just."^
2
H. A. Wieschhoff, Colonial Policies in Africa (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, I9 /+4 ), p. 3
2
5Ibid.
, p. 75.
Traditionally, no chief was entitled to sell tribal land, but
in 1889, when land was required to nurture the already acquired cattle
herd, the Berlin government proclaimed an ordinance that took tribal
lands from the natives. The ordinance proclaimed, among other things,
"that the land, of course, must be transferred from the hands of the
natives to those of the whites, which is the object of the colonializa-
tion in the territory." It was not too long, however, before tribal
emotions, long repressed and contained, translated themselves into a
violent consciousness. The Herero tribe rumoured that the British were
preparing to advance into the territory to do battle with the Germans
to save the natives from German maladministration. Before the British
could advance, the Herero ethnic group armed itself and attacked the
settlers, while the Germans retaliated by embarking on an extermination
expedition. Though the German counteroffensive broke the resistance of
the natives, it also broke the labor force much needed for colonial
settlement. The German colonial administration required all natives
over the age of seven to carry passes, a system which the government
in Pretoria perpetuates half a century later. Stringent laws restrict-
ing freedom to actualise one's humanity were enacted: for example,
"No tribesman could acquire land or animals without official permission.
Any natives without visible means of support or livelihood will be
«
5
punished for vagrancy." The colony lived in constant fear then as it
**R. S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement (New York:
Doubleday, Page and Co., 1922)
,
Vol. 1, p. 263*
^Ruth First, South West Africa (London: Allen Lane The Penguin
Press, 1963) » P* 82.
5does now, because Pretoria has ruled it by Proclamation.
It must be remarked that the German colonial record was not
peculiar to Germany alone. What others had done before her, in secret
or silence, she could not do without open assault. The pacification of
Algeria by the French, the rule of King Leopold's rubber regime in the
Congo, and Portuguese, English, and Dutch plunder of African slaves,
were no less ugly. But by the twentieth century, such a colonial record
could be relegated to the history books. The victorious nations of
World War I had much to gain from Germany's decline, by launching a
devastating moral attack. Britain and South Africa put Germany's dismal
colonial record on display not because they wanted to champion the African
cause, but because they wanted to discredit the Germans. Since the War
was fought professedly for idealistic purposes, no country was prepared
to perpetuate the horrors of such a war through annexation. South
West Africa had been conquered by the troops of Botha and Smuts, and
annexation would have seemed natural but for President Wilson's Four-
teen Points and the climate of public opinion. There were strategic
reasons for German colonies' being appropriated by the victors, but in
the prevailing popular mood of enthusiasm for a new world, such reasons
would not have sounded good. Power-political moves had to be cloaked
as moral ones, for open annexation was recognized as popularly unaccept-
able. President Wilson's famous Fourteen Points stipulated:
. . . a free, open-minded and absolutely impar-
tial adjustment of all colonial claims, based
upon a strict observance of the principle that
in determining all such questions of sovereignty.
6the interests of the populations concerned
must have equal weight with the equitable
claims of the Government whose title is to
.
be determined.
6
The device was the improvisation of the international mandate.
Before the outbreak of World War I, prominent officials in
England as well as in South Africa feared that the Germans might even-
tually use South West Africa as a base for military and naval operations
to attack South Africa and to gain control of the southern route to
India. A note of sobriety in the paeans of praise and hymns of endorse-
ment over the defeat of Germany by the South African forces under
General Smuts could be read in all South African newspapers. The Daily
Mail
,
for example, editorialised that "it is not the standard of civili-
zation that vanishes from the map but the black flag of a nation of spies
and criminals. "Wherever Germany rules there is tyranny and brutality,
and no greater boon could be conferred upon the native races of Africa
8
than to relieve them from the abomination of German misgovemment.
Though Germany administered South West Africa for only eight years before
the outbreak of World War I, the South African administration which suc-
ceeded it in 1920 has not attempted to improve the German colonial policy
of Government by Proclamation but has exacerbated its evils.
6
R. W. Imishue, South West Africa , "An International Problem"
(London: Pall Mall Press, 1965), p. 2.
^Daily Mail
,
9 September, 1916.
O
Western Morning News , 20 March, 1917.
7The de facto incorporation of Namibia into South Africa adds
another dimension of expanding colonialism by Pretoria into southern
Africa. Colonies are sometimes characterised as distinct territorial
and social entities with clear demarcation, and separated by seas or a
great land mass from their imperial metropolis. The Pretorian empire,
in contrast, forms a contiguous tract. The imperial rulers are not
spacially separated from their colonial subjects. Native Africans and
white settlers are closely integrated into a single social organism.
This integration tends to obscure the colonial element; its existence
in South Africa as well as in Namibia can be discerned by comparing the
socioeconomic structures and the political contribution of its inhabi-
tants. The socioeconomic incompatibility in South Africa has been made
possible through the application of apartheid by the ruling elite. A
colonial policy depends idealistically on the political theory prevalent
in the metropolitan area of the colonial power. Apartheid, which is a
way of life in South Africa, has been extended to Namibia, though the
mandate given to South Africa says that "the Mandatory shall have full
power of administration and legislation over the territory subject to
9
the present mandate as an integral portion of the Union of South Africa."
The bestowal of a mandate did not confer full sovereignty, but only the
responsibility of administering it, in conformity with the principles of
the whole mandatory system, in trust for its inhabitants, which was the
promotion to the "utmost the material and moral well-being and the social
9
Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 2.
8progress of its inhabitants."
The policy of South African racial apartness has been at the
heart of the difficulties between South Africa and the United Nations
since the triumph of the Nationalists in 1948. While the policy of racial
segregation goes back almost to the first years of the colony at the Cape,
it has become a philosophy of life since 1948, thoroughly rationalised
and elevated to a moral principle and sometimes to a religious dogma.
The philosophy of apartheid has been applied with rigid consistency to
every phase of life with rarely a deviation from principle. The goal is
to demarcate a number of separate territories in South Africa and Namibia.
Each tract will be occupied exclusively by a distinct ethnic community.
The reserved areas will be linked to white South Africa in varying
stages of development. The inhabitants will exist mainly on wages
earned in the "white" zone by migrants from the "homelands." This implies
the abandonment by the African natives of their claims to a share of the
whole country and enables them to pursue their aspirations in their par-
ticular bantustans. In 1947, the Election Manifesto of the National
Party described the system this way: "In general terms our policy en-
visages segregating the most important ethnic groups and sub-groups in
their own areas where every group will be enabled to develop into a
self-sufficient unit. We endorse the general principle of territorial
segregation of the Bantu and whites. . . the Bantu in the urban areas
should be regarded as a migratory citizen not entitled to political and
social rights equal to those of the whites. The process of detribalisation
9should be arrested. . ."^ Settlers do not invent new culture, but only
transfer and adapt their own. Namibia has been an extension of the South
African social structure. There are differences in the degree of develop-
ment, living standards, and patterns of labor organization of its inhabi-
tants. "The policy of apartheid a6 applied to Namibia holds back the
advance of the natives, and perpetuates the myth of white untouchability
.
Although Article 2, clause 2 of the Covenant of the League of Nations as
applied to South West Africa clearly states:
The Mandatory shall have full power of adminis-
tration and legislation over the territory sub-
ject to the present mandate as an integral
portion of the Union of South Africa, and may
apply the laws of the Union of South Africa to
the territory, subject to such local modifies- a
tions as circumstances may require.
The Mandatory shall promote to the utmost the
material and moral well-being and the social
progress of the inhabitants of the territory
subject to the present mandate.
In I960 the governments of Ethiopia and Liberia filed concurrent
applications with the International Court of Justice instituting conten-
tious proceedings against the Union of South Africa, contending that
South Africa had violated its obligations under the mandate, chiefly by
introducing apartheid. They contended that apartheid was in violation
10
UNESCO, Apartheid, "Its Effects on Education, Science, Culture
and Information" (UNESCO Publication, 1967 )
1
P* 14*
1
^Ronald Segal and Ruth First, South West Africa (London: Andre
Deutsch, 1967) > P* 108.
"^Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 2.
10
of the spirit of Article 2, clause 2 of the Covenant of the League of
Nations. The fifteenth session of the General Assembly of the United
Nations convened in September, 1960, marked an important point in the
history of the Organization. The United Nations had been created pri-
n^rily through the efforts of states with a European or European—derived
political and social culture possessing a common history of political
involvement at the international level. During its first ten years,
the Organization was dominated by the problems and conflicts of these
same states. By 1955, however, the process of decolonialization which
had marked the post-1945 political arena began to be reflected in the
membership of the United Nations. In the hierarchy of priorities of the
new nations which came to the United Nations, no issue exceeds in impor-
tance and commi tment than securing a speedy and complete end to Western
colonialism.
For the new nations the traditional concern of the United Nations
with human rights has been but another vehicle for advancing their attack
on colonialism and associated forms of racial discrimination. Tradi-
tionally, the promotion of human rights has been viewed from the perspec-
tive of protecting the citizens in the fullest possible exercise, compat-
ible with organized society, of those rights which flow from the dignity
and worth of the individual. For this perspective, centered as it is on
the individual, the new nations have substituted a perspective centered
on the evils of Western colonialism with its domination of black by white.
As Louis Henkin had aptly noted,
The struggle to end colonialism, also swallowed
up the original purpose of cooperation for
11
promotion of human rights. Th© gradual elimina-
tion of dependent areas and their admission to
the United Nations meant an ever increasing
, Assembly majority with some agreed attitudes,
particularly a determination to extirpate the
remnants of white colonialism and white dis-
crimination. These attitudes impinged on the
human rights program as well. Of course, they
assured the sharpest scrutiny of human rights
in dependent areas. . . But it was a champion-
ship of anti-colonialism, designed to accel-
erate ’'self-determination." It was not an
assertion of general standards which other
nations, including the champions, were Pre-
pared to accept in their own countries. ^
For example, the Kremlin would consider it an interference in its internal
affairs if other countries appeal for democratisation and liberalisation
of the policies toward its citizens. Over the past few years, the con-
science of mankind has cried out against restrictions applied to Jews
who wish to migrate to Israel.
It is noteworthy that the extension of African membership, the
African year of the United Nations, was accompanied by the passage of the
Declaration of Colonial Independence by a formally unanimous vote, with
nine states abstaining, among them the United States, the United Kingdom,
France, Belgium, and Australia. The immediate starting-point for this
Declaration was a "Soviet request, laid before the Assembly by Nikita
Khrushchev, for the adoption demanding immediate freedom for all non-
self-governing countries."**1 These are the major portions of the
*\ouis Henkins, "The United Nations and Human Rights," Inter '
national Organization , Summer 1965, (Vol. 19, no. 3), P* 512.
^Rupert Emerson, "Colonialism, Political Development and the
U.N.," International Organization , Winter 1965, (Vol. 19, no. 3),
p. 495.
12
Declaration:
1» ... ruled that the subjection of peoples
« to alien subjugation is contrary to the
United Nations Charter.
. .
2. ... recognized the right of all peoples
to self-determination.
. .
3. ... denied that inadequacy of preparation
could ever be a pretext for delaying inde-
pendence.
. .
4. ... called for an end to all repressive
measures directed against dependent peoples. . .
5. ... sought immediate steps to transfer all
powers to the people of territories not yet
independent.
. .
6. ... held incompatible with the Charter any
attempt to disrupt the national unity and
territorial integrity of a country.
.
.13
In brief, colonialism was stripped of its legitimacy, and self-
determination of colonial peoples was substituted for it, with a further
guarantee of their independent integrity when freedom was achieved. The
Namibian problem is a phase of the decolonialization problem, complicated
by racial ideology, goading Ethiopia and Liberia into action through
their membership in the United Nations. It compelled them to desire to
eradicate speedily the remaining bastions of European colonialism. The
strong anti-colonial sentiment of the post-war world, which found such
fervent and sweeping expression in the Declaration on the granting of
independence to colonial countries and peoples, brooks no delays and no
excuses or exceptions to the demand for political independence, regardless
^Paraphrased from UNGAOR, 15th Session, Supp. no. 16 (A/4684)
Res. no. 1565 (XV)
,
Dec. 1960.
13
of the social and economic conditions which may obtain in these remnants
of empire. With the exception of New Guinea, the situation in Namibia
is probably the most difficult in the world because of her diverse ethnic
composition. There are numerous ethnic groups with long histories of
mutual vituperation, and sometimes belligerence, going back to times be-
fore the British came. To complicate matters, the government in Pretoria
induced white nationals to settle in the territory by selling them large
farms and giving them generous financial assistance. As a result of the
immigration, white settlers from South Africa now constitute the second
largest ethnic group, and the most powerful, in Namibia.
Namibia originally was in the position of a crown colony. An
administrator acting on instructions from Pretoria exercised legislativ
and executive functions. African Affairs, Police, and Defense were all
integrated with corresponding departments in South Africa. The terri-
tory was administered separately in other respects. The Constitution of
1925 introduced representative government, but only for the white set-
tlers. They were made responsible for the election of two-thirds of the
committee in the legislative Assembly, and dominated the executive com-
mittee as well as the advisory council. African Affairs, Defense, and
Police were reserved subjects on which the Assembly was forbidden to
legislate without permission from Pretoria. But in 1955 African Affairs
was transferred to the Department of Bantu Administration in Pretoria,
which meant some loss of autonomy for the legislative body, but were
compensated with a seat in the South African parliament. The indigenous
inhabitants remained unrepresented and subject to direct control from
Pretoria. The concentration of power in Pretoria is said to guarantee
14
bureaucratic patrimonialism to the African natives. Such a guarantee
in the 1925 Constitution provided a poor framework for building polit-
ical participation of the natives and democratic self—governmental process
which might be in conformity with twentieth century constitutional prac-
tice. The essence of the 1925 Constitution remained unchanged until
Pretoria passed the "South West African Affairs Act" of 1949, which vir-
tually made South West Africa the fifth province of the Union of South
Africa. This change was interpreted by the anti-colonial advocate at
the United Nations as a move toward total incorporation, as the rela-
tionship between South West Africa and Pretoria became little differ-
ent from that between the four provinces of the Union to Pretoria.
Under the 1949 constitutional development, the European community was
empowered to elect six representatives to the Union House of Assembly
and two senators for a period of ten years. The Governor-General of
South West Africa was empowered to appoint two senators, one of whom is
chosen for his '^acquaintance with the reasonable wants and wishes of the
colored races of the territory." With the new Act of 1949, the legis-
lative Assembly retained its eighteen members but with increased power
to handle education, land, agriculture, banks, crown lands, mines, and
minerals. All powers of legislation vested in the Governor-General were
transferred to Pretoria; and the Union's control over South West Africa
was further increased.
15
CHAPTER II
THE INTERNATIONAL MANDATE
The advocates of the Mandates system believed that it was an
amplification of the Berlin Congo Act of 1885
,
in which European powers
entrusted the task of administering the Congo Basin to King Leopold II
of the Belgians. Germany initiated the policy of "internationalisation"
in 1884-85 when Bismark established the "Congo Free State" as a state
bound by international guarantees of free state under the administration
of Leopold II of the Belgians. King Leopold himself invigorated this
myth of international state with his address to the international
geographical conference when he declared that "to open to civilisation
the only part of the globe where it has not yet penetrated, to pierce
the shadows which envelop entire populations, is, I am bold to say, a
crusade worthy of this century of progress."^ The Berlin Congo Act was
a result of action by European powers to regulate imperialism — to pre-
vent the political and economic collision of European powers by enacting
the open door policy of the Congo Basin. But King Leopold's administra-
tion became a caricature of the concept of trade by all nations accord-
ing to the mandate given. The Congo States administration was based on
the principle that a colony should be exploited for the benefit of the
metropolitan country, against the spirit of the Covenant of the League
of Nations' mandate based on self-determination for the natives.
—
^Raymond Leslie Buel, The Native Problem in Africa , (2 vols.J
New York: Macmillan, 1928), Vol. 2, p. 415.
—
16
The Berlin Conference did many things, but it did not establish
an "international state" in the Congo. There was much talk of "inter-
nationalisation" at the time, but it merely meant, in the words of the
Manchester Guardian
, that the Congo State was to be "a great free state
in which civilized men of all nationalities can carry on the peaceful
o
arts of trade without exclusive privilege to any." The Berlin Act was
an unprecedented, if ineffective, experiment in international control in
the tropics, but nothing was said about international administration or
limitations on sovereignty. Significantly, both the Berlin Congo Act
and the Mandates system were bom in war to solve the problems of peace.
As the Allied troops overran the German colonies in World War I,
British publicists began to debate whether these territories should be
returned to Germany, placed under some sort of international control, or
divided and annexed by the conquering powers. There was little support
for the proposal to hand the colonies back to Germany, simply because of
the widely held belief in German "atrocities" and "maladministration" in
Africa. The proponents of internationalisation supported their stand
with precedents from the traditions of the Roman Empire, British admin-
istration in Egypt, and the European powers’ Berlin Congo Act of 1884-85.
But the Mandates system, in contrast to the Berlin Congo Act, was
a triumph of self-determination over imperialism, internationalism over
nationalism, free trade over monopoly, and humanitarianism over slavery.
It became apparent that those countries with the most influence in the
^December 31, 1885.
17
establishment of the Mandates systems were those whose colonies and
frontier territories had been most influenced by humanitarian concern for
the welfare of native peoples: Great Britain and the United States.
This sense of responsibility had two roots in both countries:
for the British, in the reaction to the abuses of the East India Company;
for the Americans, in recompense for the partial extermination of the
Indian tribes of North America; and, for both, in the antislavery crusade
and the missionary expansion into Africa and Asia. The idea of guardian-
ship was not exclusively Anglo-American. Its origins can be traced back
to the Hispanic-Iberian culture of the sixteenth century, in bureaucratic
patrimonialism. Edward Burke popularised the whole concept of tutelage
when he declared in 1783:
All political power which is set over men,
and. . . all privilege claimed or exercised
in exclusion of them, being wholly artificial,
and for so much, in derogation from the nat-
ural equality at large, ought to be some way
or other exercised for their benefit. . .
Such rights or privileges, or whatever else
you choose to call them, are all in the
strictest sense a trust; and it is of the
very essence of ^very trust to be rendered
accountable. . .
International concern for South West Africa, as well as for other
German and ottoman colonial possessions began after World War I. At the
peace conference in Paris, the Allied and Associated Powers (the United
States, France, Britain, Italy, and Japan) forced Germany to surrender
her colonial possessions. The revulsion against German colonial rule
^Speech of Edmund Burke on Fox's Eastern Bill, Dec. 1 , 1783 *
18
was perhaps a wartime phenomenon, partly created by British Foreign
Office propaganda which attempted to prove that the Germans had committed
atrocities in Africa as well as in Europe.^ Whether or not the propa-
ganda was true, its other effect was to strengthen the arguments of those
who, regarding imperialism not only as the cause of the atrocities in the
German colonies but as one of the causes of the war as well, believed
that imperialism must be brought under control.
The disposition of South West Africa was not in the hands of South
Africa but of Britain, even though the territory was conquered by South
Africa in the Allied cause, and the Allies were responsible for determin-
ing the future of the territory at the Peace Conference. Although the
Allies were sympathetic towards annexation, by South Africa it was
politically impracticable at that time. The Mandates system itself
apparently emerged as a compromise between the warring annexationists
and the idealists. The idealists viewed the Mandate system as a forward
step towards internationalisation, while annexationists rejoiced over the
mandate improvisation as nothing but annexation in all but name. The
idealists’ main objectives in the settlement of colonies were:
1. protection of the interests of the
indigenous people, which were held
to be paramount;
2. establishment of a system of tutelage
to ensure this protection;
3. non-annexation of ex-enemy colonies;
^See for example, "Report on the Natives of South West Africa
and Their Treatment by Germany, 1918," Accounts and Papers , August
1918 (Vol. 17).
19
4. expression of the settlement reached in
formal legal terms . J
Leaders of Allied nations were preoccupied with their search for
conditions essential to permanent peace. In Britain, Lloyd George, the
British Prime Minister, stated three conditions essential for permanent
peace: "the establishment of the sanctity of treaties; a territorial
settlement based on the right of self-determination; or the consent of
60me international organisation to limit the burden of armaments and
diminish the probability of war."^ In the United States, meanwhile,
President Woodrow Wilson developed similar ideas from which his famous
Fourteen Points emerged, which later made possible the peace feelers of
the Central Powers and the arrangement of the Armistice in November 1918
The essential point of his speech was: "the principle of justice to all
people and all nationalities and their rights to live on equal terms of
liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak. Un-
less this principle be made its foundation, no part of the structure of
7
international justice can stand." Later Woodrow Wilson announced his
"Four Principles" in two of which he advocated that "peoples and provinces
are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they
were mere cMttels and pawns in the game, even the great game, now
^R. W. Imishue, South West Africa , "An International Problem"
(London: Pall Mall Press, 1965)* P* 2.
^John Wellington, South West Africa and Its Human Issues (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1967), p. 258.
7
H. W. V. Temperly , A History of the Paris Peace Conference .
Vol. iii (London: Frowde, Hodder and Stroughton, 1920), p. 343*
20
discredited, of the Balance of Power 1 ' but that, "every territor-•
isl settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for
the benefit of the populations concerned, and not as a part of mere
o
adjustment or compromise of claims among rival states."
The speech has contributed to the rise of nationalism in most
colonial countries. Ideally, the United States did not share the irri-
dentist desires of her Allied comrades across the Atlantic because of her
desires to have free market; but also at this time in history there was
a change in the human course occurring in Europe too. The Paris Confer-
ence met in the wake of the first great Socialist Revolution. The
Bolsheviks, led by Lenin, had just smashed one of the oldest autocracies
in the world and liberated one of the largest colonial empires. The re-
sult was a tremendous boost to the revolutionary working class movement
of colonial and semi-colonial peoples. The social upheaval in Russia
undoubtedly shook the Allied faith in annexation, and added to the popu-
lar demand in Europe and America for a democratic peace: a peace, with-
out annexations and indemnities, which should be based upon freely
chosen self-determination for all nations.
Meanwhile, General Smuts of South Africa, who along with Woodrow
Wilson was often credited with the Mandates system, wanted all German
colonies in Africa treated differently. "Africans were too backward for
the principle of self-determination." In Smuts* opinion, "Africa is
inhabited by barbarians, who not only cannot possibly govern themselves
O
John Wellington, op. cit ., p. 259.
21
but to whom it would be impracticable to apply any ideas of political
self-determination in the European sense." General Smuts had urged in
particular that South West Africa should be annexed to the Union of South
Africa because it "is essential to their own security as well as the
cause of human liberty in general." 10 This idea was rejected because of
the Allied unanimous commitment to Woodrow Wilson’s ideals not to share
the spoils of war; consequently the A, B, C classification of German
colonies emerged as a compromise.
The central idea of the Mandates system was therefore embodied in
the first paragraph of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of
Nations:
To those countries and territories which as a
consequence of the late war have ceased to be
unddr the sovereignty of the States which for-
merly governed them and which are inhabited
by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves
under the strenuous conditions of the modern
world, there should be applied the principle
that the well-being and development of such
peoples form a sacred trust of civilization.
Countries classified under the "A" category, whose independence
was in sight, were territories which had belonged to the Turkish empire.
”B" mandates were former German territories, especially those in Central
Africa like Tanganyika, Burundi, and Urundi. South West Africa, however,
fell under the "C" category, in the spirit of clause 6 of Article 22:
Q
Ronald Segal and Ruth First, South West Africa (London: Andre
Deutsch, 1967), p. 73.
10
Ibid., p. 62.
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There are territories, such as South-West Africa
and certain of the Islands in the South Pacific,
which, owing to the sparseness of their popula-
.
tion, or their small size, or their remoteness
from the centres of civilisation, or their geo-
graphical contiguity to the mandatory state, and
other circumstances, can be best administered
under the laws of the mandatory state as inte-
gral portions thereof, subject to the safeguards
... in the interests of the indigenous popula-
tion.
In accordance with Article 2, Part 1, of the Covenant of the League of
Nations, the mandate of South West Africa was conferred upon "His
Brittanic Majesty to be exercised on his behalf by the Government of the
Union of South Africa," because she was classified among Advanced nations
who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical
position, can best undertake the administrative responsibility of South
West Africa. An agreement between the Council of the League and South
Africa was signed in December, 1920. Article 2 of the Mandate stated
that the Mandatory shall have "full power of administration and legisla-
tion subject to the present mandate as an integral portion of the Union
of South Africa, and may apply the laws of the Union of South Africa to
the territory subject to such local modifications as circumstances may
require." While the agreement gave South Africa broad legislative and
administrative power over the territory, it did not, even by implication
indicate that annexation was the ultimate goal of the arrangement. The
agreement stipulated that the Mandatory shall "promote to the utmost the
material and moral well-being and social progress" of the inhabitants by
prohibiting slave trade; proscribing forced labor except for essential
public works and services; controlling the traffic in arms and munitions
prohibiting the supply of intoxicating spirits to the natives; giving no
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military training to the natives other than for purposes of internal
police and the local defense of the territory; establishing no military
or naval bases or erect fortifications in the territory; and also insur-
ing freedom of conscience and religion.
The public response to the creation of the Mandates system was
one of skepticism in England as in South Africa. J. A. Hobson, a radical
waiter, described it as a thin veil for the annexation of enemy countries
and the division of spoils by imperialists. 1 ' 11 A periodical (South
Africa, Feb. 6, 1919) stated the point which reflected the prevailing
sentiment of White South Africans at the time. It asked,
What is a mandate? What is to be the final
elucidation of the mandatory theory we know,
and all South Africans know what it must not
mean. It must not mean that the natives of
South West Africa are to have any ground for
supposing that if they are dissatisfied at
any time with the Union Government some mys-
terious League across the seas will take up
their imaginary grievances. The mandatory
theory will have to be very carefully applied
to South West Africa, or it may easily contain
the germs of future trouble.
The "germs of future trouble" have become today's diseases in the
relationship between the South African government and the world over
Namibia. Article 22 was couched in rhetorical and argumentative rather
than legislative language which reflected the origin of its compromise.
Except for those countries in the "A" class, there was no end provided
in the mandates. In practice, the "mysterious League across the seas"
has proved to be a weak reed for the people of Namibia to lean on.
11
Ibid
. ,
p. 80.
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CHAPTER III
THE QUESTION OF JURISDICTION
In the League of Nations, the Permanent Mandate Commission was set
up to examine reports on the various mandated territories as agent of the
League Council. This body was composed of nine members, all chosen for
their presumed expertise on matters affecting the lives of the inhabi-
tants of the territories. Comments or suggestions made by any of the
members were considered personal and did not necessarily reflect the
views of the governments from which the members came. The Permanent
Mandates Commission reported its annual deliberations to the Supreme
Council of the League of Nations rather than to the Assembly. The fact
that the Assembly could not deal directly with matters affecting the
mandates constituted one of the major weaknesses of the Mandates system,
which should have made final responsibility revert to the League through
its Assembly. The Supreme Council was composed of practically all the
Mandatories. Although Article 3 of the Covenant stated that the Assembly
"could deal with any matter within the sphere of action of the League,"
this provision could enable the Assembly to consider questions concern-
ing the mandates, but did not in any way mean that it had final responsi-
bility. In the last resort and under the circumstances, the best the
League could accomplish was to function as "a keeper of the Supreme
Council's conscience" on matters affecting mandates.
The Supreme Council interpreted its function regarding the man-
dates as that of ascertaining whether or not the administration of the
Mandatories had conformed to the best interests of the native
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populations. Thus, with regard to the responsibility of the League for
securing the observance of the terms of the mandates, the council inter-
prets its duties in this connection in the widest manner. A number of
procedures were instituted for obtaining information on and conducting
investigation of the mandates.
The chief source of information was an annual report to the
Council through the Commission by each of the Mandatory Powers. In
order to facilitate the preparation of the reports, the Commission drew
up a set of comprehensive questionnaires designed to cover the three
types of mandates: these questionnaires included legislative or admin-
instrative decisions adopted by the mandated territories. Article 22,
which established the Mandates system, did not grant to the inhabitants
of mandated areas the right to petition the Commission. Later amend-
ments provided that petitions could be received from indigenous ihabi-
tants or from any other source; but petitions could be sent to the
Secretariat of the League only through the Mandatory, which in turn would
make what comments it deemed necessary before sending the petition to the
League. Any other source than the indigenous inhabitants could send a
petition directly to the Permanent Mandates Commission for a decision.
The right of petition was usually accorded the class "A” mandates, and
only very rarely did any petitions from types nB" or "C" come under con-
sideration. It was thought at the time that the hearing of controversies
would in effect turn the work of the Commission into that of a court of
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law and thus weaken the authority of the Mandatory power. With all these
restrictions, the League had little or no contact with the indigenous
peoples and, as a consequence, its capacity to oversee effectively the
administration of the mandated territories was limited. Despite its lim-
itations, the Mandates system of the League of Nations was a significant
step forward, compared to previous attempts at supervising the governance
of dependent peoples. The Mandates system demonstrated that an inter-
national organization could not only supervise the administration of de-
pendent peoples but also could provide an orderly process by which they
might achieve independent status.
South Africa’s authority as the mandatory power in South West
Africa rested on legal instruments: Article 22 of the Covenant of the
League of Nations and the Mandate Charter laid down the basic rules of
administration. The "material and moral welfare" of the populations of
mandated territories was the pivot of the Mandates system: it made
Article 22 the basis of the "sacred trust of civilization," for which
South Africa in repeated declarations accepted its responsibility under
the Mandate. Most members of the League and of the Mandates Commission,
in their conception of their sacred trust, made the interests of the
native inhabitants their highest priority. South Africa wanted to develop
the territory with the status of the white population as the highest
priority, so that the "uncivilized natives" might learn from them.
South Africa took advantage of the ambiguity of Article 22 by
legislating the Color Bar Act, which limited certain responsible and
supervisory occupations to persons of European race. Article 22 left
the issue of sovereignty unclear, by failing to draw a line between
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administrative and legislative freedom; but the Color Bar Act was incom-
patible with the spirit of the mandate.
Another South African policy was to retain the German policy of
requiring the carrying of passes by the native populations. In the words
of Jim Hogland of the Washington Post
, a pass "proves the existence of
South Africans." For the convenience of administration, South West
Africa was divided into zones, known as Police Zones and the Tribal
Areas. Three-quarters of the territory, inhabited by the Europeans,
constituted the Police Zones, from which natives without passes were
restricted; the Tribal Areas were administered indirectly by South
Africa through the tribal chiefs. The Mandates Commission found the
system of reservations, insulated from external ideas and influence,
hard to reconcile with the spirit of the mandate. South Africa, however,
claimed that conditions in the territory justified the system as a means
of promoting the welfare of the people. South Africa later justified
apartheid as a way to reduce racial conflict among age-old antagonists,
and to maintain traditional cultural sanctity among the tribes. Although
the Union promised to promote to the utmost the material and moral well-
being and the social progress of the inhabitants, the native majority
has been denied economic, social, political, and educational opportunity.
Under the system of political apartheid natives have not had the right to
vote on any important issue or to hold public office. Financial apartheid,
according to the United Nations Committee on Namibia, has meant exclusion
of non-Europeans in every culturally relevant field, including education,
technical and professional training, provision of credit, marketing
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arrangements, and disposal of land and mineral rights. The Permanent
Mandates Commission questioned whether these disadvantages would enable
the inhabitants to advance, or whether they would perpetuate the stagnant
social structures at their deplorably low level. The Mandates Commission
concluded that South Africa’s policy in the territory fell short of what
the mandate required of South Africa, compared to the policies in other
mandates territories. The League made its most severe censure of the
South African administration after the native uprisings in 1922 and 1925.
The first test of South African suitability as a mandatory power
came when in 1925 revolts erupted for various reasons among the
Bondelswart tribe: the Union government had imposed a tax on dogs,
which were indispensible to the hunting tribesmen; the tribe rejected
the headmen imposed upon them in place of their oldtime headman who had
gone to Pretoria during the War; and the Union government would not allow
the escaped headman to come back home from Pretoria. When he did return
without proper authorisation, the Union government ordered the reserva-
tions bombarded from the air for nine hours. South Africa also charged
3
a number of native leaders with high treason.
The League of Nations Mandates Commission concluded that the
trouble was due basically to native grievances arising from legislative
and administrative action of South Africa on behalf of the white settlers.
^U.N. Report of the Committee on South West Africa, 15th Session,
Supp. No. 12 (A/4464, 1960), p. 32.
3
Freda White, Mandates (London: Jonathan Cape, LTD., 1926),
pp. 136-37.
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The Chairman of the Commission, Marquis Theodoli, stated that while the
mandatory's first duty should be to the natives, in this case South
Africa had "pursued a policy of force rather than of persuasion and fur-
ther that policy had always been conceived and applied in the interests
of the colonists rather than in the interests of the natives. The Com-
mission could not approve of such a method of imposing forced labour for
4
the benefit of private individuals."
The Rehobothers enjoyed some degree of autonomy under the German
administration and in fact defended their territory during the War, and
were promised by General Smuts the preservation of their autonomy. In
1923, Pretoria offered the Rehobothers an agreement which would give
their traditional council official recognition as one of its own admin-
istrative organs in the mandate; this agreement was signed by the council
members. The majority of the Rehobothers were incensed and opted for
complete independence under the Union Jack; to acquiesce in their demand
would not only violate the mandate's principles but would be incompatible
with the veiled policies of South Africa towards the territory. When
rebellion broke out against what the Rehobothers regarded as South
African intervention in their internal affairs, Pretoria declared martial
law and hundreds of the Rehobothers were seized. The Permanent Mandates
Commission was skeptical of South African handling of the mandate issue,
but it did nothing. In 1922, South Africa enacted the Railways and
Harbours Act, which gave the impression that those "assets were conveyed
^Quincy Wright, Mandates Under the League of Nations (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1930), pp. 209-10.
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in full dominion to the Governor-General of South Africa” to be incorpor-
ated into the Union system; the Mandates Commission reminded South Africa
that such an "Act contravened Article 257 of the Treaty of Versailles and
the mandate” and that "the Union had no right to annex or confiscate the
5railway and ports." By an Act of Parliament in 1924, the Union govern-
ment proposed to naturalise all the German inhabitants of South West
Africa, and therefore requested League permission to do so.^ With the
constitutional question in mind, the Commission approved the proposal
with some reservations. T^at approval showed the weakness of the Man-
dates system, since the Commission avoided making decisions on constitu-
tional questions in order to avoid political issues.
The Permanent Mandates Commission did not function during World
War II, but nevertheless coexisted with the United Nations Organization
for six months at the end of the War. If the Union had wanted to annex
South West Africa, the War offered a good opportunity. But Smuts wanted
sovereignty over the territory with the stamp of international recogni-
7
tion. At the death of the League, no specific recommendations concern-
ing the transfer of mandated territories were made to the United Nations.
The League resolution stated that the Assembly "recognizes that on the
termination of the League's existence, its functions with respect to the
^League of Nations, Permanent Mandates Commission, Minutes , 6th
Session, 1925, P* 64
^
Ibld . , 2nd Session, 1922, Annex 6, p. 91*
V K. Hancock, Smuts , 2 Vols.( Cambridge, Eng.: University Press,
1962, 1968), Vol . 2, Fields of Force, 1919-1950, p. 467-
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mandated territories would come to an end, but noted that Chapters XI,
XII, and XIII of the Charter of the United Nations embodied principles
corresponding to those in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League."
The Assembly also "takes note of the expressed intentions of the Members
of the League now administering territories under mandate to continue to
administer them for the well-being and development of the peoples con-
cerned in accordance with the obligations contained in the respective
mandates, until other arrangements have been agreed upon between the
g
United Nations and the respective mandatory powers." Many of the legal
squabbles which emerged over the jurisdiction of South West Africa stem
from the League's inability to establish the locus of sovereignty over
the mandates. There is no statement in the documents of the Paris Peace
Conference, the records of the League, or the mandates agreements, which
indicates where sovereignty lies. At the death of the League, its mem-
bers did not declare the mandates agreement invalid, but simply recog-
nized that the administering powers of mandated territories should con-
tinue to rule their mandates until other arrangements could be made.
With respect to the controversy which developed between the
United Nations and South Africa in 1949 the important article of the
Chapter is Article 77, which stipulated that the trusteeship system
"shall apply to such territories in the following categories as may be
placed thereunder by means of trusteeship agreements: a) territories
now held under mandate." Section 2 of the Article stated that it will
^League of Nations, Plenary Debates, 21st Session, 7th meeting,
p. 11.
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be a matter for subsequent agreement as to which territories in the fore-
going categories will be brought under the trusteeship system and upon
what terms." Important, too, in this connection, is Article 80, which
provides that until such individual trusteeship agreements have been
concluded nothing "in this chapter shall be construed in and of itself
to alter in any manner the rights whatsoever of any states or any peoples
or the terms of existing international instruments to which Members of
the United Nations may respectively be parties." Section 2 of Article
80 is highly significant with regard to this particular controversy.
It states that this provision "shall not be interpreted as giving grounds
for delay or postponement of the negotiation and conclusion of agree-
ments for placing mandated territories under the trusteeship system as
provided for in Article 77." Had the United Nations Charter been speci-
fic in placing all mandates under trusteeship and had it named particular
territories, the legal debate about sovereignty would not have developed.
At the opening session of the United Nations, Heaton Nicholls, a
member of the Union delegation, informed the General Assembly about the
uniqueness of South West Africa, its common borders with the mandatory
power, and its relatively small population, which precluded independent
status. "This special position," he continued, "should be given full
9
consideration in determining the future of the territory." The next
step in the move toward annexation came during the second session of the
General Assembly, when General Smuts submitted a memo on the outcome of
9
United Nations, General Assembly, 1st Session, 1st Part, 12th
Plenary Meeting, 1946, p. 591.
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his consultations with the peoples of the territory as to their future
status. On November 4, 1946, General Smuts, at the end of the meeting
of the Fourth Committee, declared that South West Africa was essentially
a part of the South African territory, "because of the physical contiguity
of South West Africa to the Union and its anthropological kinship with the
rest of South Africa. The South African delegation at the first part
of the session of the General Assembly had not Joined other mandatory
powers in undertaking to place territories under trusteeship, because it
had felt that the Union had an obligation to consult the peoples of South
West Africa about their future status.
Consequently, Smut6 submitted a memo which indicated unanimous
support by the European community through a vote at South Africa's legis-
lative assembly for the mandate f e incorporation into the Union. The
Union government claimed that the African natives had also been consulted
through their traditional leaders, who were paid by the Union government.
The General Assembly rejected the bid for incorporation and advised South
Africa to put the territory under the trusteeship system. It is impor-
tant to note that the Mandates system had emphasised the welfare of the
inhabitants of the territory while the trusteeship system stressed the
obligation to promote political self-determination of the people. The
Union government, having realised the unpopularity of its case in the
General Assembly on political grounds, changed its tactics to those based
on legal Juristic grounds, which, in fact have remained effective to this
day.
10
Amry Vandenbosch, South Africa and the World (Lexington: University
Press of Kentucky, 1970), p. 208.
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i. On the demise of the League, South Africa
was not empowered to, and did not in fact,
transfer its rights and powers in regard to
South West Africa to the United Nations;
ii. the Union was, and still is, de jure as well
as de facto in possession of South West Africa;
iii. the Union of South Africa has not by inter-
national agreement consented to surrender such
rights by signing the Charter of the United
Nations
;
iv. the overwhelming majority of both the European
and non-European population of South Africa
has expressed itself in favor of incorporation
in the Union;
v. in the circumstances the Union owes no respon-
sibility whatsoever, as regards the administra-
tion of the territory to the United Nations or
to any other international organisation or to
any other body.H
These legal facts constituted a retreat from South Africa's previous
reasons of geographical contiguity and ethnological identification with
the territory. The main point at issue was whether or not South Africa
was legally bound to conclude a trusteeship agreement for the territory
as provided in Articles 77, 79 of the United Nations Charter (see Appen-
dix) .
The Union government rejected any obligation to sign a trustee-
ship agreement, because it believed that the League's rights over the
mandate had not passed to the United Nations, but preferred to administer
the territory in the spirit of the mandate and agreed to submit reports
^South Africa, Votes and Proceedings of the House of Assembly ,
9th Parliament, 4th Session, 1947, p. 149, motion by Mr. Eric Louw.
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of its administration to the United Nations. South Africa did submit one
such report to the United Nations in 1946, for the purpose of informing
the United Nations without acknowledging United Nations jurisdiction over
South West Africa. The Trusteeship Council was not satisfied with the
report because Pretoria had done little to advance the indigenous people
socially, economically, and politically, due to her policy of racial
segregation. South Africa, however, justifies it as having the following
, . 12
objects
:
a) to prevent race deterioration, to preserve
race integrity and to give the different
racial groups an opportunity to build up
and develop their own race life;
b) to protect each community against infil-
tration by the other;
c) to prevent racial animosity which would
inevitably arise if the life of the differ-
ent races were inextricably mixed;
d) to prevent unemployment and the overcrowd-
ing of urban areas with all their attendant
evils.
In 1948, General Smuts was replaced by the Nationalist Party under
Prime Minister Daniel Malan, who announced that the mandate was no
longer in force. With the South West African Act of 1949, the Union gov-
ernment pulled the territory closer to South Africa. South Africa's
declared policy challenged the assumption by the United Nations of all
the powers of the League of Nations. The trusteeship system was devised
to replace the Mandates system, the purpose of which was recognized in
12
UNGAOR, 4th Session, 4th Committee, 1949, pp. 201-2.
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the winding up of the League of Nations. Although the General Assembly
is not the legislature of a World State and cannot enforce law, the
United Nations is morally bound to uphold the standards of human rights
derived from the consensus of the international community for an inter-
national territory. The United Nations contention that it should be
responsible for the territory has been the subject of protracted legal
and political battle since the inception of the United Nations.
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CHAPTER IV
UNITED NATIONS, WORLD COURT, AND SOUTH AFRICA
%
When it became clear, after the ascendance of the Nationalist
Party to power in South Africa, that the Union government would not
enter into a trusteeship agreement or accept the international responsi-
bility of submitting reports, the United Nations General Assembly asked
the International Court of Justice for its advisory opinion. In December,
1949, the General Assembly posed the following questions which centered
upon the international status of the territory and the international ob-
ligations of South Africa arising therefrom:
a) Does the Union of South Africa continue to
have international obligations under the
mandate for South West Africa and, if so,
what are these obligations?
b) Are the provisions of Chapter XII of the
Charter applicable and, if so, in what man-
ner to the territory of South West Africa?
c) Has the Union of South Africa the compe-
tence to modify the international status
of the territory of South West Africa, or,
in the event of a negative reply, where
does competence rest to determine and mod-
ify the international status of the
territory?
^
In plain language, the legal issues were whether the mandate were
still in force and whether the United Nations were legally competent to
exercise the supervisory functions of the former League of Nations. The
government of South Africa, which appeared before the Court, contended
that the mandate had expired with the dissolution of the League. The
Court unanimously held to the contrary, stating:
^UNGAOR, 4th Session, Plenary Meetings, 1949, pp. 44-5.
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The mandate was created in the interests of
the inhabitants of the territory, and of human-
ity in general, as an international institution
* with an international object — a sacred trust
of civilization.
. . If the mandate lapsed, as
the Union government contends, the latter's
authority would equally have lapsed. To retain
the rights derived from the mandate and to deny
^the obligation thereunder could not be justified.
The Court ruled that the need for international supervision over
the mandate continued to exist even though the League of Nations Council
had disappeared, inasmuch as supervision is an essential part of the
Mandates system and the United Nations has an international organ which
performs similar functions. Here, the Court held that South Africa is
under an obligation to submit to the supervision and control of the Gen-
eral Assembly and to render annual reports. In response to another
question, the Court unanimously agreed that the Union government had no
competence to modify unilaterally the international status of South
West Africa or any of the "international rules respecting the rights,
powers and obligations relating to the administration of the Territory
and the supervision of that administration." The Court also held, with
five Judges dissenting, that the Charter did not require South Africa
to place the territory under the trusteeship system, even though this
was the normal course which the framers of the Charter had expected.
-3
With the clarification of the legal issues, it became imperative
that the United Nations persuade South Africa to initiate practical
^International Court of Justice, Reports of Judgements Advisory
Opinions and Orders (The Hague, 1950), pp. 132-33.
3
Ibid.
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steps to conform to the advisory opinion. Since an advisory opinion
by the Court has no binding character, Pretoria discredited it as an
abortion of the judicial process. The General Assembly, meanwhile,
set up an Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate and also to act as an interim
superivsory body, but its work was handicapped from the start by South
Africa's denial of any accountability to the United Nations. As a
compromise gesture, the Union government agreed to negotiate but with
only the three remaining Allied Powers (France, the United Kingdom, and
the United States of America, its major trading partners). Refusing to
accept the United Nations as the heir of the League, the Union government
proposed to draw up its own plan for administering the territory in the
spirit of the mandate, however, without the continuing obligation to
make annual reports or to permit petitions, both crucial to the effective-
ness of the Mandates system. Under this plan, the International Court
of Justice would be given judicial supervision over South Africa's ad-
ministration of South West Africa. The Ad Hoc Committee considered the
plan to be incompatible with the principle of international accountabil-
ity, and unacceptable because it did not fully implement the Advisory
Opinion of 1950.
In November 1953 the General Assembly established the Committee
on South West Africa, with powers more extensive than those of the still
functioning Ad Hoc Committee. The Committee was asked to establish
supervision and to formulate a procedure for examining reports and
petitions which conformed to procedures followed by the Permanent
Mandates Commission. ^ The questions which arose following the 1950 Advis-
ory Opinion were monumental. "How could the United Nations establish
effective supervision if the Union did not transmit reports and petitions?
Did the General Assembly have the legal authority to continue to hear
oral petitions from individuals who were qualified to speak on the sub-
ject of South West Africa? In voting on important issues should the
United Nations follow the principle of unanimity used by the League, or
should it follow the provisions of it6 own Charter, which stated that
5important questions could be decided by a two-thirds majority?" The
General Assembly asked the International Court of Justice to rule on
these questions. The Committee on South West Africa had proposed that
decisions of the General Assembly on questions relating to reports and
petitions about South West Africa should be regarded as important ques-
tions within the meaning of Article 18, Section 2 of the United Nations
Charter — meaning that proposals would need a two-thirds majority to
pass. The Court was thus asked:
a) Is the following rule on the voting proce-
dure to be followed by the General Assembly
a correct interpretation of the Advisory
Opinion of the International Court of 11th
July, 1950:
^Decisions of the General Assembly
on questions relating to reports and
petitions concerning the territory of
South West Africa shall be regarded
as important questions within the
meaning of Article 18, Paragraph 2,
^General Assembly Resolution, 8th Session, Res. 749A(VIII).
^Faye Carroll, South West Africa & the United Nations (Lexington:
University of Kentucky Press, 1967)* P* 63*
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of the Charter of the United Nations?'
b) If this interpretation of the Advisory Opinion
of the Court is not correct, what voting pro-
cedure should be followed by the General
Assembly in taking decisions on questions
relating to reports and petitions concerning
the territory of South West Africa? 6
The majority opinion of the court concluded that the special
rule F (providing that questions in connection with reports and petitions
require a two- thirds majority for their decisions) gave a correct inter-
pretation of its Advisory Opinion of 1950, because the term "degree of
supervision" referred to substantive matters rather than to "procedure."
On the question of "conformity as far as possible with League procedure,"
the Court concluded that any alteration in the terms of the mandate did
require unanimity, but since it was an established principle that no
country was the judge of its own, the Court did not believe that manda-
tories holding a seat in the League could have been permitted to exer-
cise a veto which could frustrate the operation of the Mandates system.^
The only practical result of this advisory opinion was to reassure the
members of the General Assembly that their voting procedures were legally
correct.
The next legal battle erupted when the "South West Committee"
decided that in order to fulfill its task, oral hearings of native inhabi-
tants or an outsider with impeccable probity might be necessary. Though
6
November
7
U. N. Doc. A/L 178 as General Assembly Res., 904(IX) of 23
,
1954.
International Court Reports (The Hague, 1955) , pp. 40-60.
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the right to petition was granted in 1926 by the Permanent Mandate
Commission, despite South Africa’s contention that the League had died
and that she was no longer obligated to transmit written petitions, it
was imperative that the Committee find a more suitable way of receiving
information about the territory. The International Court was asked:
Is it consistent with the advisory opinion of
the International Court of Justice of 11th July,
1950, for the Committee on South West Africa
established by the General Assembly Resolution
74a(VIII) of 28th November, 1953, to grant oral
hearings to petitioners on matters relating to
the territory of South West Africa?^
The Court declared that oral hearings would not be inconsistent
with its 1950 advisory opinion but that the General Assembly must be sat-
isfied that such a course was necessary for the effective international
supervision of South West Africa. The Court also concluded that, owing
to South African non-cooperation, oral hearings were justifiable. Oral
hearings, it was believed, would give the Committee a better chance to
judge the merits of petitions, and consequently reduce the burdens of
the mandatory powers.
Meanwhile, the Committee on South West Africa had embarked on
its task of studying conditions in the territory without cooperation
from the South African government. Its report was a factual description
of conditions in the territory based largely on published sources of
United Nations Specialised Agencies as well as petitioners. It referred
to the lack of participation of the natives in the judicial organisation
8
U. N. Doc. A/316: GAOR, 10th Session, Supp. 19, 1955, pp. 19-24.
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of the territory
,
the existence of corporal punishment, forced residence,
an undeveloped penal system and racially discriminatory legislation in
the territory. The report concluded:
After thirty-five years of administration under
the mandates system, the native inhabitants are
still not participating in the political develop-
ment of the territory.
. . Their participation
in the economic development is restricted to that
of labourers, and. . . the social and educational
services for their benefit are far from satisfac-
tory. ^
Between 195A and its dissolution in 1961 the Committee on South West
Africa submitted eight annual reports, all without cooperation from South
Africa, none of which had any praise for South African administration.
Before its dissolution, the Committee had been asked in 1957 by the Gen-
eral Assembly to study the legal recourse available to insure that South
Africa fulfill its obligations under the mandate. The Special Committee
appointed a working group consisting of representatives from Brazil,
Finland, and the United States to study the feasibility of judicial re-
course. It advised the General Assembly that '’there would be little
doubt that the right to invoke Article 7 of the mandate is enjoyed at
any rate by those former members of the League which were members at the
date of dissolution of the League and which are now members of the United
Nations."^
Despite the roadblocks, the General Assembly accomplished two main
objectives in its tactics and debates on South West Africa. It helped to
9
U. N. Doc. A/2666, Supp. 14, 1954, Report of the Committee on
South West Africa
,
p. 31.
10
U. N. Doc. / 3625 , GAOR, 12th Session, 1957 Supp. 12a.
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kindle indignation in world opinion about the South African policy and
to make the South West Africans aware of their exploited position as
well as of the possibility of change. Although no compromise was
reached, the General Assembly tried to avoid pressure tactics in the
hope that Pretoria would continue to accord the territory of South West
Africa an international status. But Pretoria’s absolute refusal to
put South West Africa under trusteeship and the United Nations’ equally
stern refusal to permit incorporation of the Mandate into the Union,
paved the way for a contentious proceedings brought to the International
Court of Justice by Ethiopia and Liberia in 1960. The objective was
not to resolve doubt concerning the status of the Mandate, which had
been clarified in the Advisory Opinion of 1950, but to transform an
Advisory Opinion into an enforcible judgement. The political cause of
the legal dispute was the desire of many in particular, of the indepen-
dent African states to make headway in their attack upon the practice
of apartheid in general and its compatibility with the mandate. If the
court had ruled that the practice of apartheid were inconsistent with
the "utmost moral well-being and social progress," it would have struck
an important blow against apartheid and could as well have put pressure
on the Western Powers on the Security Council who urged legal recourse
rather than a stronger stand against South Africa. The new ingredient
which would be introduced by a favorable judgement in a contentious pro-
ceeding — and this was the heart of the matter — would be the potential
application of Article 94 of the United Nations Charter. It states that:
If any party to a case fails to perform the
obligations incumbent upon it under a judge-
ment rendered by the Court, the other party
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may have recourse to the Security Council,
which may, if it deems necessary, make rec-
ommendations or decide upon measures to be
taken to give effect to the judgement.
Ethiopia and Liberia, as former members of the League, had ini-
tiated contentious proceedings against South Africa in 1960. The subject
of the litigation was defined in the Applicants Memorials: "Whether the
Mandate still in force, whether the United Nations had supervisory author-
ity, and whether South Africa was violating its obligations under the
mandate by, among things, imposing an extreme form of racial discrimina-
tion upon the non-white inhabitants of the territory." The South African
government entered preliminary objections challenging Ethiopia’s and
Liberia’s standing to bring the suit contending that "the Court had no
jurisdiction to hear or adjudicate upon the question of law and fact
raised by the Applicants The Court ruled in 1962, dismissing the
South African objections and upholding its competence to proceed with
the merits of the issue which Ethiopia and Liberia had referred to it.
In 1966 the Court extricated itself from the difficulties involved in
a decision on the real question at hand by ruling on a previous question,
and declaring that the Applicants did not have the legal interest to
obtain a judgement. Note that one of the South African prelimirary ob-
jections rejected by the Court in 1962 was that Ethiopia and Liberia did
not have sufficient interest to obtain a hearing on the merits when one
of the merits to be decided was whether Ethiopia and Liberia had
^International Court of Justice, South West African Cases
(Ethiopia v. South Africa , Liberia v. South Africa ) , Preliminary Ob-
jections, Judgement of 21 December, 1962, I . C . J . Re ports , 1962, pp. 321fj_.
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sufficient interest* It is doubtful that such a contradictory ruling
could be the intention of the Court, nor could it be the interpretation
of the 1962 ruling when the International Court of Justice ruled that:
The language used (in the Mandate) is broad,
clear and precise: it gives rise to no am-
biguity and it permits of no exception. . .
Members of the League were understood to have
a legal right of interest in the observance
of the Mandatory of its obligations both
toward the inhabitants of the Mandated Ter-
ritory and toward the League of Nations and
its members. 12
The 1966 judgement nicely poses jurisprudential alternatives between
teleological (Ethiopia and Liberia) and consensus-oriented principles
(South Africa).
The 1966 judgement holds that even in order to gain a hearing be-
fore the International Court Ethiopia and Liberia would have to show how
their interests as self-serving sovereignties were affected. The Court
rejected the notion that these two countries represented the interests
Of the world community, because the international common interest in
the well-being of the inhabitants of a mandated territory can be only a
"moral" as against a "legal" interest. Article 2 of the Covenant of the
League conferred upon the mandatory the right to have "full power of
administration over the territory. . . as an integral portion of the
Union of South Africa and its laws but subject to local modification as
circumstances may require." Certainly South Africa has the right to
12
South West Africa Cases ( Ethiopia v. South Africa , Liberia v.
South Africa ) , Preliminary Objections, Judgement of 21st December, 1962:
I.C.J. Reports, 1962, p. 343*
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administer the territory as she pleases and there is no legal way to
interfere in her administration, as long as she applies her domestic
rules to South West Africa. Moral judgements about the nature of rules
applied to the mandated territory cannot be taken as imperatives of the
law.
Judges Percy Spender and Gerald Fitzmaurice argued in their 1962
joint dissent that with respect to the provision that South Africa must
"promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being of the inhabi-
tants,"
there is hardly a term which could not be applied
in widely different ways to the same situation or
set of facts, according to different subjective
views. . . A large element of subjectivity must
enter into any attempt to apply these terms to
the facts of a given case. They involve ques-
tions of appreciation rather than of objective
determination. -*-3
The consequence of such a reasoning would be that the mandate
given to South Africa gave it the power to determine what constitutes
well-being in South West Africa just as every sovereign state is at
liberty to govern itself in accordance with its notions of the well-
being of its citizens. What bearing does this have on the United Nations
of denunciation of racial discrimination? Any denunciation seems to be
irrelevant since the United Nations is but a collection of sovereign
states.
The fact that a majority of nations has a common opinion does not
make that opinion law, because the United Nations is not a legislative
13
Ibid
. ,
pp. 466-467.
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body. Therefore its declarations and resolutions against racial discrim-
ination or apartheid are without legal effect. In short, the conservative
jurisprudence interprets the role of the United Nations in the South
West African case with emphasis on Article 2, section 7 of the United
Nations Charter, which states that:
nothing in the present Charter shall authorise
the United Nations to intervene in matters which
are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of any state or shall require the Members to sub-
mit such matters for settlement under the present
Charter.
South Africa in its defence opted for a conservative jurisprudential
principle. The mandate had lapsed, she contended, with the dissolution
of the League of Nations, and, hence there is no legal basis for contend-
ing that South Africa has anything but a free hand in South West Africa.
On the other hand, Ethiopia and Liberia chose the teleological jurispru-
dential approach as supported by Article 22 of the Covenant of the League:
To those colonies and territories. . . which are
inhabited by peoples not yet able to govern them-
selves under the strenuous conditions of the
modern world, there should be applied a princi-
ple that the well-being and development of such
peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and
the securities for the performance of this trust
should be embodied in this Covenant.
The mandated territories are the responsibility not of a state or
a group of states but of "civilization." It is as the community of ad-
vanced states that the League of Nations involved itself with the mandated
territories. The "securities" added should safeguard not the interests
of the states but rather "the performance of this trust," that is, the
trust given to civilization in general. From the adivsory opinion in
1950, the United Nations was to be the authoritative overseer of the
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legacies of the League of Nations. A trust given to the international
community could not be less, so that no matter what happened to the
specific organization, the community remains despite the effacement of
the League. Therefore a new organization which may with good reason
be considered the new organ of the community has the right and duty to
supervise the administration of the mandate. As Judge Tanaka put it:
The mandatory continues to have obligations in
relation to an impersonal entity, namely the
organized international community as before...
which is personified as the United Nations. 4
Judge Tanaka acknowledged that South Africa was given wide dis-
cretionary powers by the mandate provisions, but the exercise of these
powers must be in accordance with international law. And, Tanaka argues,
apartheid is prohibited by the international norm of equality before the
law. Equality before the law as a "general principle of the law" is
a principle recognized by virtually all states.
^
Tanaka's argument
leads to a rule of international law forbidding racial discrimination
which would prohibit apartheid not only in South West Africa but in South
Africa as well. Thus he made an extremely far-reaching case: that the
consensus of the international community can render illegal a significant
portion of a domestic legal order. The international clamor that erupted
after this judgement came not only from the General Assembly alone but
also the editorial page of the Johannesburg Star in South Africa itself:
^Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tanaka in South West Africa Cases »
Second Phase, p. 270.
15
Ibid.
,
p. 272.
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Turning its back firmly on the great questions
that move the world of the second half of the
20th century
,
such as racial discrimination and
the responsibility of the United Nations for the
welfare of non-self-governing peoples, the court
cast an eye on the plaintiffs as if seeing them
for the first time and asked what right they had
to be there at all. None, it decided (though by
the narrowest possible majority) and threw the case
out without further ceremony.-*-^
The General Assembly reacted by declaring that South Africa had
to insure the moral and material well-being and security of the
indigenous inhabitants of South West Africa" and had "in fact disavowed
the mandate." It decided that the mandate was terminated and that
henceforth South West Africa came "under the direct responsibility of
the United Nations." The Assembly created an Ad Hoc Committee to recom-
mend practical means by which the territory should be administered so
as to enable its inhabitants "to exercise the right of self-determination
and to achieve independence."^
Under the Terrorist Act of South Africa thirty-five Africans were
tried for alleged violation of certain laws which exacerbated the fury
at the United Nations. The General Assembly and the Security Council
called on South Africa to release the accused. The United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly by Resolution 2372 (XXII) of June 12, 1960 proclaimed that
South West Africa should henceforth be known as Namibia in accordance
with the desire of its people.
^
Johannesburg Star
,
July 23,
^UNGAOR, 21st Session, Supp.
27th October, 1966, pp. 2-3.
1966, p. 1.
No. 16 (A/6316), Res. No. 2145 (XXI),
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To insure the legality of the termination of the mandate, the
General Assembly for the sixth time presented the international Court
of Justice with one question: What were the duties of states in the
aftermath of Resolution 2145' s pronouncement on the illegality of South
Africa's actions?
South Africa adhered to its formalistic principle once again,
emphasised a strict textual reading of the treaties and charters. The
intention of the parties at the time of the agreement must be ascertained
and applied where the text is insufficient; the subsequent evolution of
new substantive legal doctrine in international law was therefore deemed
18
irrelevant. On the other hand, the Secretary-General on behalf of th<*
United Nations evinced the teleological approach: "the international
community had legal obligations toward the territory, which were derived
from the norms developed in the United Nations Charter and subsequent
resolutions, because South West Africa having been administered by the
League of Nations until 1946, and thereafter by the United Nations, had
>|19
international status and was regulated by international rules." The
court in its ruling found that both the General Assembly Resolution 2145
(terminating the mandate) and Security Council Resolution 276 (proclaim-
ing the illegality of South Africa) were valid. Resolution 2145 had
specified that South Africa had not lived up to its duties of administra-
tion and had not "insured the moral and material well-being and the
^International Court of Justice, December, Vol. 1, pp. 381 97.
Written Statement of South Africa, Pleadings, Oral Arguments.
19
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security of the indigenous citizens of Namibia." 20 The Court confirmed
the power of the General Assembly to revoke the mandate holding that the
League of Nations' implied power to terminate the mandate had been trans-
ferred to the United Nations. The Court also made clear that member
states of the United Nations were obliged to recognise the illegality
of South Africa's presence in Namibia. Member states were advised to
refrain from any acts with South African government implying recognition
of the legality of, or lending support and assistance to, Pretoria's
illegal rule. The decision, though not binding on members of the United
Nations, nevertheless put on trial the Union government's long-maintained
claim of legitimacy. It brought to an end a protracted legal battle in
international law, over which organ was in fact responsible for Namibia.
The Namibia situation has elicited a variety of proposals for
further action. The Council for Namibia was authorised by United Nations
Resolution 2248 to commence operations in the territory until indepen-
dence should be achieved, but South Africa has never permitted the
council to enter the territory. Resolution 2248, among other things,
was established to administer Namibia and to take over the administration
facilitating the exodus of South African personnel. The Council's
duties were also specified to include legislating until a territorial
legislature should be established, summoning an assembly to draw up the
constitution under which an election could be held, and maintain law
and order. But all these mandates have not materialised because of a
2
°General Assembly Res., 2145 para. 3, 21 UNGAOR, Supp. 16, at.
2. U.N. Doc., A/6316, 1966.
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notable absence of Western Powers from membership. The United States
in principle accepted the Court's opinion but expressed reservations on
the Charter interpretation though she voted for Resolution 301. "The
U.S. would discourage investment by its nationals in Namibia, would not
make available Export- Import Bank Credit guarantees and other facilities,
and would not assist United States citizens who invested in Namibia on
the basis acquired after the adoption of General Assembly Resolution 2145
in protection of such investment against claims of a future lawful govern-
21
ment of Namibia." Such declared principle by the United States gravely
obscures the real American involvement in South Africa. American invest-
ment in South Africa is nearly one billion dollars: the rate of return
on South African investments is over 20% per annum, double the rate of
return on the United States foreign investments throughout the rest of
22
the world. It is difficult also to overcome the standing problem by
any group that challenges the Internal Revenue Service's crediting of
taxes paid to South Africa by American Corporations operating in Namibia.
In the Flast v. Cohen 392 U.S. (1968) case, a taxpayer challenging
federal expenditure is required to show that specific constitutional
limitations, e.g., the first amendment had been violated.
21Statement by Ambassador W. Taply Bennett. U.S. Delegation to
Ga
. ,
Press Release USUN-164 at 2-3 (Oct. 20, 1971)*
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Amry Vandenbosch, South Africa and the World (Lexington:
University of Kentucky Press, 1970), pp. 282-283*
54
CHAPTER V
THE FUNCTIONS OF
.
UNITED NATIONS ORGANS AND AGENCIES
The United Nations Charter refers to the problem of human rights
in its Preamble and in six different articles. In the Preamble, the
peoples of the United Nations express their determination "to affirm
faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human
person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and
small." The words "promoting and encouraging respect for human rights"
and "assisting in the realization of human rights and fundamental free-
doms" appear, with certain variations, in Article 1, on the purposes
and principles of the United Nations; in Article 13, on the General
Assembly; in Article 62, on the Economic and Social Council; and in
Article 76, on the International Trusteeship system. In Article 56,
read together with 55, "all members pledge themselves to take joint and
separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achieve-
ment" of a number of purposes which "the United Nations shall promote,
among them universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language,
or religion."
Among the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, there are
four with special interest in the protection of specific human rights and
<Q 4
freedoms. These are the International Labor Organization, the Constitu-
tion of which recognizes "that labor is not a commodity and that all
human beings, irrespective of race, creed, or sex, have the right to
pursue both their material well-being and their spiritual development
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in conditions of-.freedom and dignity of economic security and equal
1 / 7.
opportunity;” the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization, the purpose of which is ”to contribute to peace and secur-
ity by promoting collaboration among nations through education, science
and culture in order to further universal respect for justice, for the
rule of law and for human rights and fundamental freedoms;"
2
the World
Health Organization, the Constitution of which declares that "the enjoy-
<L.
ment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental
3
rights of every human being;" and the Food and Agricultural Organiza-
tion of the United Nations, one of the basic purposes of which is that of
contributing towards an expanding world economy and ensuring humanity's
4freedom from hunger."
Within these many organs and bodies, it is the Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, established
in 1947 by the Commission on Human Rights which has been given primary
responsibility for dealing with matters relating to racial discrimina-
tion. The Sub-Commission was given a mandate to undertake studies
particularly in the light of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
and to make recommendations to the Commission on Human Rights concerning
the prevention of discrimination of any kind relating to Human Rights and
^.U.N., 1946-47, p. 662.
2
Ibid
.
,
p. 713.
^Ibid
. ,
Annex III, p. 793.
4
Ibid., Annex II, p. 693.
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fundamental freedoms. Activities and initiatives undertaken by the Sub-
Commission have produced concrete results in a number of cases, because
its recommendations have been studied further by various organs and
agencies of the United Nations.
The primary danger of any revival of Nazism is that undemocratic
groups, using racial intolerance and brutal violence as a political tool,
may be able to bring dramatic infringements of human rights. In recent
years, concern has been expressed in a number of international agencies
regarding the danger of the revival of Nazism and racial intolerance.
The General Assembly of the United Nations, in Resolution 2345 (XXIV)
passed in 1969, expressed its profound concern at the further intensifi-
cation of activities by groups and organizations which carry the malig-
nant ideologies and practices of Nazism, including its present-day
manifestations, racism and similar ideologies and practices. Contempor-
ary manifestations of resurgent Nazism, like Hitlerite fascism in South
Africa, reflect the theory and practise of racial superiority, built
into the educational system, expressed in scientific and cultural activ-
ities. Genocide was one of the most heinous acts associated with
Hitlerite Nazism of which the General Assembly in Resolution 96 (I) of
1946, affirmed that ’’genocide is a crime under international law which
the civilized world condemns, and for the commission of which principals
and accomplices — whether private individuals, public officials and
statesmen, and whether the crime is committed on religious, racial, or
any other grounds — are punishable." Pursuant to the same resolution,
on account of the South African policy of racial segregation - apartheid
the General Assembly drew an analogy between apartheid and genocide in
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Resolution 2145 (XXI) of October, 1966, when apartheid was labelled "a
crime against humanity."
From 1952 to 1959, the General Assembly adopted a number of resolu-
tions which condemned the racial policies of South Africa, but did not
recommend any specific measures by member states. The General Assembly
declared in Resolution 6166 (VII) that in "a multi-racial society harmony
and respect for human rights and freedoms and the peaceful development
of a unified community were best assured when patterns of legislation
and practice were directed towards assuring equality before the law of
persons regardless of race, creed or color, and when economic, social,
cultural and political participation of all racial groups was on a
basis of equality." It affirmed that governmental policies of a member
state which were not directed towards this goal but were designed to
perpetuate or increase discrimination, were inconsistent with the
pledges of the Members under Article 56 of the Charter. All members
were urged to bring their policies in conformity with their obligations
under the Charter to promote the observance of human rights and funda-
mental freedoms. By Resolutions 721 (VIII), 820 (IX) and 917 (X), the
General Assembly expressed concern that the South African government
had continued to give effect to the policies of apartheid and reminded
it of the faith it had reaffirmed, in signing the Charter, in fundamental
human rights and the dignity and worth of the human person.
Since 1962, in view of South Africa’s government's non-compliance,
the General Assembly had hardened its position with a series of condemna-
tions and has repeatedly recommended that member states of the United
Nations take specific action against the government of South Africa.
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By Resolution 1761 (XVII) of November, 1962, the Assembly, inter
alia, requested Member States to:
a. ) break off diplomatic relations;
b. ) close their ports to all vessels flying the
South African flag;
c. ) enact legislation prohibiting their ships
from entering South African ports;
d. ) boycott all South African goods and refrain
from exporting goods, including all arms, to
South Africa;
e. ) refuse landing and passage facilities to all
aircraft belonging to the company or compan-
ies registered under the laws of the Republic
of South Africa.
As South Africa persisted in its refusal to comply with resolu-
tions of the General Assembly, the Assembly felt that it should recommend
still stronger measures. In several resolutions^ it directed its appeals
not only to member states, in general, but also specifically to a certain
group of states: the Assembly urgently appealed to the major trading
partners of South Africa which encouraged the government of South Africa
to defy world opinion and to accelerate the implementation of the policies
of apartheid; condemned the action of the states which through politi-
cal, economic, and military collaboration with the Union government
were encouraging it to persist in its racial policies; also requested
the specialised agencies to deny technical and economic assistance to
South Africa. The Security Council took into consideration the policy
^
General Assembly Resolutions 2054 A(XX)
,
2202 (XXI)
,
2307 (XXII)
,
2396 (XXIII) and 2506 (XXIV)
.
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of apartheid for the first time in 1960, after the Sharpeville incident,
at the request of thirty-two African states. By Resolution 134 (1960)
the Security Council:
a. ) recognized that the situation in the Union
was one that had led to international fric-
tion and if continued might endanger inter-
national peace and security.
b. ) deplored the policies and actions of the
Union Government which had given rise to
the current situation.
c. ) called upon the Government of the Union to
initiate measures aimed at bringing about
racial harmony based on equality in order
to insure that the situation would not con-
tinue or recur and to abandon its policies
of apartheid and racial discrimination.
Despite the repeated requests by the General Assembly the Economic
and Social Council, and the Commission on Human Rights, the Security
Council has not yet considered the question and dangers of apartheid
a threat to international peace and security. The Economic and Social
Council and the Commission on Human Rights of the United Nations, in a
series of resolutions, called for economic and diplomatic sanctions
against South Africa. ^ In Resolution 2 (XXIII) of March, 1967, the Com-
mission drew the attention of humanitarian organizations to take urgently
appropriate action to help alleviate the inhuman action in South Africa
and South West Africa. Consequently the General Assembly adopted Resolu-
tion 2054B (XX)
,
which called upon member states to support the United
6
Resolutions 2 (XXII), 5 (XXIII), 3 (XXIV), 5 (XXV) of the Com-
mission on Human Rights: Resolutions 1164 (XXLI) , 1332 (SLIV) and
1415 (XLVI) of the Economic and Social Council.
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Nations Trust Fund for the victims of apartheid. This fund is being
used to assist Southern African students in overseas colleges. Further-
more, the Council and the Commission on Human Rights have given special
attention to the question of ill-treatment and torture of political
prisoners. In Resolution 1302 (XLIV)
,
the Economic and Social Council
discredited the continuing infringement of trade union rights and the
unlawful prosecution of trade union workers. It called upon the Union
government to conform to the generally accepted international standards
which emphasised the freedom of association. At the meeting of the
International Conference on Human Rights held at Teheran, Iran, 1968, a
resolution condemning apartheid declared that it was a threat to inter-
national peace and security. It also declared its "emphatic recognition
and vigorous support of the legitimacy of the struggles of the people and
patriotic liberation movements in Southern Africa toward the achievement
of their inalienable rights to equality, freedom, and independence in
accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations. It also encouraged the Security Council of the United Na-
tions to take appropriate action against South Africa under Chapter VII
and in particular under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations,
which include strong economic sanctions.
Besides adopting the various resolutions, the General Assembly
and the Security Council acted also on another level. A number of
committees and study groups came to light, empowered to study the racial
situation and to make appropriate remedies.
7
Y.U.N.
,
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The overwhelming majority of states have condemned apartheid and
consider it a flagrant violation of the principles of the United Nations
Charter. However, in view of the South African government’s failure to
comply with the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security
Council, and even to cooperate with the various bodies set up to study
the situation, the International Community has been under strong pres-
sure from various humanitarian organizations to go beyond moral condemna-
tion, and to envisage compulsory measures against the Union government.
While a great majority of states favor a decisive action by the
Security Council, a small but powerful minority, composed largely of the
major trading partners of South Africa, has so far shown an extreme
g
reluctance to follow such a course. This division of the internationa
community is reflected in pronouncements of Western powers who believed
that the clout of industrialization would exert relaxation on the poli-
cies of apartheid; which cannot be destroyed by coercion but by legal
means. The General Assembly’s appeals in its resolutions for member
states to discontinue commercial and diplomatic relations with South
Africa have been openly disregarded by such governments as the Federal
Republic of Germany, France, Italy, United Kingdom, and the United States
of America, which still allow their nationals to continue to increase
their trade with South Africa as well as their volume of investment.
The seminar on Apartheid held in Brasilia in Brazil also noted that
"those member states which declined to serve on the Special Committee
Q
UNSCOR, 1056th Meeting, 7 August, 1963, p. 6.
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on the Policies of Apartheid of the Union Government were the principal
trading partners of South Africa. It was pointed out that if those
countries stopped trading with South Africa, they would commit economic
9
suicide." The unwillingness of certain Security Council Members to
support the principle of Mandatory Sanctions has thereby frustrated
timely and effective action by the United Nations.
In accordance with the General Assembly Resolution 1978A (XVIII)
which requested the Secretary-General to seek ways and means of provid-
ing relief and assistance through international agencies, a number of
specialised agencies have taken action with regard to the policies
of apartheid. The Food and Agricultural Organization in its conference
of the 5th of December, 1963, adopted a resolution which stated "that
the government of South Africa would no longer be invited to participate
in any of the Organization until the Conference decided otherwise ."^
South Africa, henceforth, withdrew from membership in the Food and Agri-
cultural Organization on the 18th of December due to her non-compliance
with the fundamental principles of the Organization.
The policies of apartheid, as regards labor, have been examined
by various bodies in the International Labor Organization for a number
of years. A report published in 1953 by the United Nations - Inter-
national Labor Organization Ad Hoc Committee on Forced Labor concluded
^Report of the seminar on apartheid, ST/TAO/HR/27 (A/6412),
para. 44.
“
^Report of the Special Committee on the Policies of the Govem-
ment of the Republic of South Africa, 1964, 19th Session (A/5825-S/6073) ,
para. 491, p. 154.
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that a system of forced labor of significance to the economy appeared
to exist in South Africa." 11 In 1961, the International Labor Confer-
ence called on South Africa to withdraw from membership in the Organiza-
12tion until apartheid were abandoned. In 1964, the Conference unanimously
adopted a declaration, in which it called upon the Union government "to
renounce apartheid and to take specified measures to eliminate discrimin-
13
ation in employment and occupation." The International Labor Organiza-
tion criticized the policies of the Union government which made the
organization of an African Trade Union an impossible task, mainly be-
cause of the existence of the "severely repressive legislation illegally
made applicable to Namibia such as the Suppression of Communism Act, the
14
Terrorism Act, the pass laws and the vagrancy laws." The Ad Hoc Work-
ing Group of Experts established by the Commission on Human Rights, in
a report of 1969 noted that South African Labor legislation was fully
applied to Namibia. The Working Group urged the General Assembly to
abolish the "South West African Native Labor Association (SWANLA) be-
cause it had no semblance of a trade union Organization, and that the
African worker tended to be severely penalised."
3 SWANLA is the only
organization authorised to recruit African workers residing outside the
1J
y .U.N., 1953, p. 403.
12
Y.U.N., 1961, p. 598.
13
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^The ILO and Apartheid, Paper 1, United Nations Human Rights
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Police Zone for white employers, end also the only channel through which
Africans may find work in the white areas. The Working Group urged the
United Nations to replace SWNLA by a freely constituted trade union as
provided for in the relevant international instruments. On 11 March,
1966, the government of South Africa withdrew from the Organization. The
Congress of the Universal Postal Union in its conference in 1964 approved
a declaration demanding the expulsion of South Africa from the Universal
Postal Union because of what the group called, South Africa’s policy "of
social injustice
In 1945* three years before the Nationalist party came to power,
key policy statements were made by prominent party members which the
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization found
inconsistent with its principles. They stated:
As has been correctly stated here, education is
the key to the creation of the proper relation-
ship between European and non-European in South
Africa. . . Put native education on a sound basis
and half the racial questions are solved. . . I
say that there should be reform of the whole
educational system and it must be based on the
culture and background and the whole life of the
native in his tribe. . . This whole (present)
policy is also a danger for our own Western
civilization. '
We should not give the natives an academic educa-
tion, as some people are too prone to do. If we
do this we shall later be burdened with academically
trained Europeans and non-Europeans, and who is go-
ing to do the manual labor in the country? ... I
^Report of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid ,
para. 508 1 P* 156.
^Mr. M. D. C. Wet Met, House of Assembly Debates Hansard , Vol.
52, 2 April, 1945. Cols., 4494-9-
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am in thorough agreement with the view that we
so conduct our schools that the native who
attends those schools will know that to a
great extent he must be a laborer in the
' country.
In 1951, a statement on race was published under the Organization
aegis, in which it clearly stated that there were no scientific justifi-
cations for racial discrimination. The Organization noted that the
educational system in Namibia was organized in a segregated basis, to
the disadvantage of the non-white group of the population. Upon recom-
mendation by the Economic and Social Council, the General Assembly was
convinced that the "gross and systematic violations of human rights and
fundamental freedoms in Southern Africa are of serious international
±9
concern and require urgent and effective action by the United Nations."
The text of the resolution called upon the Government of South Africa
to repeal various discriminatory laws and to help the United Nations in
restoring the human rights of the inhabitants of Namibia. The resolution
also "condemned the racist government of South Africa for its perpetuation
and further intensification of the flagrant violation of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and for its continuing affront and insult to
the human conscience." The General Assembly in resolution 2679 (XXV)
of December, 1970, established a comprehensive United Nations fund for
Namibia. The objective of the fund was to "provide assistance to
1 ft
Ibid
. ,
Mr. J. N. le Roux, Col. 4527.
19
Y.U.N.
,
1969, p. 501.
20
Ibid
., p. 501.
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however, felt it was not obligated under the terms of its agreements with
the United Nations to comply with the General Assembly's request that she
deny technical assistance to South Africa; also, under the terms of its
Articles of Agreement, she was not free to do so. It has, however, ex-
pressed its earnest desire to cooperate with the United Nations by all
legitimate means, and to the extent consistent with its Articles of
Agreement, to avoid any action which might run counter to fulfillment
of the United Nations promises. ^
In accordance with the General Assembly resolutions 1978 (XVIII),
205/4A (XX) and the recommendations of the Special Committee on the Poli-
cies of Apartheid, in Southern Africa, the Specialised Agencies took the
afore-mentioned actions against South Africa. Though the United Nations
Council for Namibia is backed by the General Assembly's mandate to legis-
late, administer and promulgate laws, after the termination of South
Africa's administration of the territory (2145XXI) but South Africa
nonetheless arrested 33 Namibians for terrorism. Protests from the
international community and the passage of Resolution 245 by the Secur-
ity Council condemning South Africa for its refusal to transfer authority
to the United Nations Council for Namibia, did not stop South Africa
24
from sentencing the arrested Namibians. With dismay and indignation
expressed in varying terms over South African action, the Special Com-
mittee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the
^Report of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid ,
1966, para. 74 » p. 31*
2Vn.N., 1968, p. 766.
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Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples, urged the Security Council to consider an effective action
under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.
The representative from the United Kingdom urged "the Security
Council to act within its clear capacity or it would be guilty of rais-
ing hopes it could not fulfill. The members should do everything possible
to act in agreement, lest they give comfort and encouragement, to those
they wished to help, but to those whose policies and actions they rejected
25
and condemned." The representative of France regretted that South
Africa had defied the appeals of the General Assembly and the Security
Council, but he took relief that none of the accused had received death
penalty.
The United Nations Council for Namibia empowered by the General
Assembly to administer Namibia has not succeeded in accomplishing any
substantial progress, due to South African lack of cooperation. In its
annual report of 1970, the Council reported its accomplishments which
included:
a) the issuance of travel
Namibians
b) the establishment of a
emergency programme of
technical assistance
c) the organization of an
and training programme
25
Y.U.N., 1968, p. 770.
26
Ibid.
,
1970, p. 742.
documents for
co-ordinated
financial and
educational
for Namibians.
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The Council also reported the reprobation of the Governments of Uganda,
Zambia, Kenya, Ethiopia and Tanzania concerning the issuance of travel
documents for Namibians. The report stated, however, that, "South
Africa's defiance of the United Nations had assumed new and disquieting
27
dimensions." It must be noted however that, whatever action taken
so far by the Council for Namibia, had been done without a visit to the
territory. When the Council intended to enter the territory in 1970,
South Africa promised to arrest the Council members for illegal trespass.
27
Ibid. p. 743.
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CHAPTER VI
THE SOUTH AFRICAN TRADE PARTNERSHIPS
Since the first session of the United Nations in 1946, South
Africa has been the target of resolutions annually. Resolution 103
(Session 1) stated that segregation is necessarily based on doctrines of
racial discrimination. Resolution 217 (3rd session) takes note of the
"Group Areas Act;" Resolution 511 (4th session) established a "Committee
on the Racial Situation in South Africa," which carried on an investiga-
tion from without (the members were not allowed to enter South Africa)
during the course of three years. Each year the committee reported to
the General Assembly how South Africa was violating the United Nations
Charter. Subsequent resolutions were much alike, but South Africa has
doggedly defended herself by citing Article 2 (7) of the United Nations
Charter, which prevents United Nations investigation into domestic mat-
ters. The proliferation of independent African countries rekindled the
anti-colonial sentiment and racialism in the United Nations. It led
to the Declaration of Independence for dependent peoples, which acknowl-
edged self-determination for all peoples. In the 15th and 16th sessions
of the United Nations, the Afro-Asian bloc introduced resolutions calling
for drastic action against South Africa, but failed to muster the two-
thirds majority necessary for passage in the plenary sessions. The
Afro-Asian states wanted the Security Council to deal with South Africa
under Chapter VII on the Charter, which is concerned with action with
respect to the threats to peace, breaches of peace and acts of aggres-
sion, but, France, the United Kingdom and the United States were not
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prepared to support action under Chapter VII — which would undoubtedly
require force to implement. Western Powers have established the pattern
in joining other countries in purely verbal condemnation of South Africa,
but stopping short of endorsing any resolution that seemed to imply
that the use of force was required, or even justified, in bringing about
changes in Southern Africa. However repugnant the racial policy of South
Africa might be, the Western powers believed its government was not threat-
ening the territorial integrity of another state. 1
In recent years, resolutions against South Africa have been passed
with relative ease in the United Nations, presumably because of the uni-
fying effect which the politics of nationalism and anti-colonialism
against the West is generating among developing nations. Despite the
Afro-Asian numerical majority and their antipathy to all faces of colonial-
ism and radicalism, the government in Pretoria has not succumbed to
international morality. I do not in anyway mean to imply that the United
Nations Organization, which is an agglomeration of sovereign nations is
ineffective because it has failed to help dependent peoples achieve
autonomy. Such a contention would be unfair because scores of African
nations have become independent since the end of World War II. But the
question remains: Why has South Africa ignored all appeals, dismissed
all protests by the international community and flouted international
morality? There ha. never been an international responsibility so clearly
and so widely acknowledged, and so flagrantly, so contemptuously defied.
1
UNSCOR 1056th Meeting, 7th August, 1963, p. 6.
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but unbacked by persuasive action by the Security Council. The General
Assembly Resolution 2145 was a bold adventure; the Security Council
Resolution 203 remained also a milestone, because they both called the
South African occupation in Namibia illegal. Why has the United Nations
failed to take effective measures to force South Africa out of the ter-
ritory and to allow the people their right to self-determination? Because
"Western nations are guided, not by principle but by economic interest,"
hence Western Nations, "will not go, up to now at least, beyond pious
2
words of regret."
Western Nations, sensitive to criticism, due to their continued
economic partnership with South Africa, have pressured to Justify policies
The basic hypothesis of the Western world, the paradigm of liberal philoso
phy, is that industrialisation, a process which, theoretically, recruits
on the basis of achievement rather than ascription, will bring about a
liberalisation of a rigid social structure.^ This reasoning is perverted
Marxism, because it accepts the notion of economic determinism while re-
jecting the violent dialectical consequences. A study by Kerr, Herbison,
Dunlop and Meyers asserts that "the industrial society tends to be an
open society inconsistent with the assignment of workers to occupations
4
or Jobs by tradition, caste, racial group, by sex or family status."
p
Africa Today Pamphlet , No. 5 (New York: American Committee on
Africa, 1962), p. 41
.
^Jim Hoagland, South Africa "Civilizations in Conflict" (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972) pp. 3^9-50.
^Clerk Kerr; Frederick Harbison; John T. Dunlop and Charles
Meyers, Industrialisation and Industrial Man (Cambridge. Harvard
University Press, I960), p. 35*
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George Kennan^ and the United States Under-Secretary for African Affairs
David Newson^ advocated similar points, in effect urging that the policy
of isolating South Africa be ended. Not only does the evolution of South
Africa, since the institution of apartheid as an official policy of the
Nationalists Party in 1948, belie this reasoning, but the racial situa-
tion of the American South reveals the contradiction of this argument
from all empirical data. The main impact of industrialisation in the
American South has been to move blacks from "the bottom of a rural lad-
7der to the bottom of an urban one." It has been widely demonstrated
that industrialisation rather than erode racism, expands it. When per-
sonnel representing outside companies set up branches or subsidiaries
in the area in question, they acquiesce and adopt local discriminatory
measures. Studies have shown moreover, that blacks incorporated in
industry were restricted to menial jobs and that this pattern has per-
Q
sisted since World War II. In a labor statistics revealed in I960, it
showed that almost 50% of all black women in the Southern States worked
as household domestics and that 51 « 9% of all black males were laborers
^George Kennan, "Hazardous Courses in Southern Africa," Foreign
Affairs , January, 1971 » PP* 218-236.
^United States House of Representatives on Foreign Affairs Sub-
committee on Africa, Policies Towards Africa in the Seventies ,
(Washington: Government Printing Press, 1970), p. 323
•
7Munro Edmonson and David Norworthy, "Industry and Race Relations
in the Southern United States," in Industrialisation and Race Relations,
Guy Hunter (ed.) (London: Oxford University Press, 1965) » P* 52.
o
Ibid ., p. 52.
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on farms or in other sectors, or service workers in public and private
o
establishments and households.
While industrialisation ipso facto has not markedly improved the
status of blacks in the American South, the situation of non-whites has
deteriorated with the industrial progress of the last twenty years in
Namibia and in South Africa itself. In fact, Bantustans policy will
reverse this process in Namibia as well as in South Africa by removing
Africans from urban areas and placing them in rural areas of agricultural
production.
"The history of the development of Southern African economy falls
into three main stages: the coercion of black labor into the compounds
of the gold and diamond mines; Britain’s establishment of the Union in
1910 so thet centralised state power would control labor in the interests
of white capital; and now the stage of apartheid, when the political and
economic pressures for cheap labor are intensified."^ It evinced the
close interdependence of vested political and business interests in South
Africa, but "businessmen in South Africa claim that they cannot be held
responsible for supporting apartheid, because they play no part in mak-
ing the laws which regulate it."^ Though, apartheid might be objection-
able, but international investment will help speed economic growth in
^Donald Dewey, "Negro Employment in Industry," Journal of
Political Economy , August, 1952, p. 75*
10
Ruth First, The South African Connection (London: Maurice
Temple Smith Ltd., 1972), p. 11.
11
Ibid ., p. 11.
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South Africa, and that meant a better standard of living for both whites
12
and blacks. Foreign investors increase their investment in the Southern
African economy not only because of the institutionalised cheap labor,
but because of the stable Government of South Africa, which is rare in
Africa today. "Stability as the investors saw it, was the important
point, not the form it took or the morality of it. Doing business con-
tinued to be the business of business, and the government's cheap-wage
policies coincides with the desire for greater stockholder profits. It
was only immoral to trade with the countries that disagreed on the
philosophy of profits, not those that strayed slightly on race." 1 -5
In view of the magnitude of foreign investment in South Africa,
international business profited from apartheid, since it underscored
the existence of power sufficient to ensure a vast and disciplined pool
of cheap labor. Also, at the diplomatic level, apartheid has not been
an insurmountable stumbling-block to relations with those countries which
South Africa counted as important; the United Nations therefore has been
ineffective in persuading South Africa to end what the World Organization
called her illegal occupation of Namibia, nor has the Organization suc-
ceeded in persuading South Africa to end her policies or racialism. In
fact, the South African Prime Minister once remarked that the "United
States will not adopt the attitude that South Africa can ever be thrown
to the wolves or be swallowed up in the fluctuating ideological streams
1
2
Jim Hoagland, Paraphrasing the Vice-President of Chase
Manhattan, p. 349*
13Ibid .
, p. 339*
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which, inspired partly by communism. . ."
1Z
* South Africa had looked up
to the United States in the anti-communist crusade, as a permanent friend,
who will never Join forces with her critics.
The discovery of gold and diamonds in South Africe at the turn of
the century, had brought investment as well as people to South Africa;
the foreign investment however has made South Africa the most developed
country on the African continent. "The British established a predominance
in investing in lucrative South African economy that they still maintain.
In 1966, the United Kingdom held a 57% share of the $5*3 billion book
value of the foreign investment in South Africa. By 1970, that total
was thought to have grown to another billion dollars and the British
1 5
share to have declined slightly to 55%*"
South Africa's economic growth accrued initially from the exploita-
tion of the mineral resources, but since 1961, manufacturing power capabil-
ity has become the most important growth sector, with 31*1% contribution
to the gross domestic product in 1968.^ Twenty-two percent of this
sector of the economy is controlled by foreign interests, whose invest-
17
ment in 1 968 alone were 31% of manufacturing investments. Yet mining
still earns the largest amount of foreign exchange; it accounted for 58%
^Africa Today Pamphlet, No* 3, p. 46.
15
Jim Hoagland. South Africa , p. 341.
^"South African Economic Framework," Africa Today , September-
October, 1970, p. 5*
^United Nations, Department of Political and Security Council
Affairs, Unit on Apartheid, Facts and Figures on South Africa (Febru-
ary, 1971 )» P* 30.
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of all exports in 1958, though total mineral sales increased considerably
ovwr the years, from 9.1% to almost $2.1 billion in 1969. 18
In spite of the overwhelming superiority of American and Japanese
industrial production, which makes them second and fourth South African
trading partners respectively, it is Europe, particularly Great Britain,
19
which dominates South African trade. Although the Union Republic has
reasonably decreased its dependence on Britain, by extending trading
partnerships to Japan as well as to the United States, Britain still pur-
chases 33% of South Africa's exports and supplies almost 25% of its im-
ports. By 1 969 > the Common Market exports to South Africa had exceeded
those of Britain, while West Germany accounted for the largest share of
20
EEC-South Africa's exports and 47% of its imports. Ruth First Judiciously
suggested that "South Africa is so integral a part of the West that apar-
21
theid merely looks like one factor in the international economic system."
Trade, which contributes 13% to the gross domestic product, is neceesary
to South Africa; despite its rapid growth since 1945, South African ex-
ports remain largely raw materials and processed goods. South Africa
still imports heavy machinery, transportation equipment and manufactured
products. Not only does Britain stand out as the major trading partner
1 8
Africa Today
, p. 5*
^Ruth First, p. 9*
20
United Nations, Agency for International Development Office
for Statistics and Powers. Bureau for Program and Policy Cooperation,
Washington D.C. (January, 1971), PP- 34 and 37.
21
Ruth First, p. 34.
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of South Africa, but she leads all other foreign investors in South
Africa. Great Britain controlled 57%, amounting to over 17 billion,
of all foreign investment in 1969* In 1971 more than 500 British com-
panies had subsidiaries or assiciates in South Africa, which makes it
conceivable that every insurance company, building society, banking in-
stitution or unit trust in Britain has some of its capital invested in
South Africa (see Appendix). South Africa has been able to attract
large amounts of foreign capital, not only because of her potential
stability, but most essentially because of her guaranteed high returns on
investment. In the early sixties, British returns on mining investment
exceeded 25-30% (see Appendix). When industries failed to expand in
Britain throughout the sixties because of a shortage of investment,
British businessmen were sending funds to South Africa. In 6pite of
South Africa's exclusion from the Commonwealth, British Prime Ministers
23did not exclude South Africa from the Sterling Zone.
More than 300 American firms were doing business in South Africa
directly or through subsidiaries in 1970, according to the United States
Department of Commerce. The book value of their investment exceeded
$1 billion with at least 15% share of all foreign investment in South
Africa. Mobil and Caltex refine over half the oil imported into South
Africa, while General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler produce 60% of South
African cars. The rate of return on American investment in South Africa
22
Jim Hoagland, p. 341*
23Ruth First, p. 35
•
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ie over twenty percent annum, double the rate from American investments
throughout the rest of the world .
^
Total sales of the United States
firm in South Africa in 1969 were about $826,000,000. In trade, the
United States sold $518,000,000 worth of goods to South Africa and bought
only $151,000,000, gaining an important trade surplus. In addition,
American investments are presently in critical areas ~ computer technology,
heavy capital goods, oil exploration and chemical industries — that
provide South Africa access to technological skills and advanced indus-
trial processes which the United States so far has denied the Soviet
Union. In February 1970, William Rogers is a ten-nation tour asserted
that "no easy solutions are foreseen for the problems of South Africa
but that we take our stand on those forces of fundamental human rights i
t
25Southern Africa as we do at home." Much about Secretary Rogers' state-
ment and those comments in Mr. Nixon's State of the World Report is
attractive in theory. "We renew our traditional commitments to demo-
cratic ideals; we abhor violence; we look toward peaceful solutions for
intractable problems." These declarations bear little relation to a
"secret memorandum plainly revealed by the State Department that the
central objective of United States policy was to preserve American eco-
26
nomic interests in South Africa." The division within the international
2
**Larry W. Bowman, "South Africa's Southern Strategy and Its
Implications for U.S.," International Affairs , pp. 19 - 30.
2
^William Rogers, Statement in Lusaka, Kinshasha, Tanzania
(The New York Times, February 15, 1970), p. 5*
Ruth First, p. 130
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community over the issue of Namibia and its reluctance to force South
Africa into terms, can best be explained in view of the Western Nations*
vested economic interests in South Africa.
Mining accounts for about half of the foreign monopolies of
Namibia's gross domestic product. In the hands of the foreign monopolies,
Namibia's rich mineral resources are being rapidly exhausted for the sake
of monopoly superprofits. The largest mining company is Tsumbe Corpora-
tion Limited, in which two United States firms, American Metal Climax
(AMAX) and Newmont Mining Company, each with 29% of the shares. Tsumbe
expects its mining operations to continue for no more than fifteen
years with a report of an average return of 470% a year, and Newmont on
the other hand estimates that its average annual return on its investment
27
on Tsumbe comes to 372%. The United Nations Council for Namibia re-
ported in 1972 that, "if the total net profits (of all companies in
extractive industries) remained where they were produced — in the ter-
ritory — they would have amounted annually to $100 per capita, several
times more than the average Namibian family receives. Such amounts of
capital would have enabled the territory to develop industries which a
28
century of South African domination has not made possible." The economic
interdependency between South Africa and the Western world has made South
Africa so integral a part of the West that apartheid merely looks like
one factor in the international monetary system. In operating in
^Ibid
.
,
p. 264.
^ Y.U.N.
,
Report of the United Nations Council for Namibia, 1972,
Vol. 1, p. 10.
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Namibia under the conditions of South Africa's rule, the foreign corpor-
ations give sanction to that rule. They do so in addition by paying
taxes directly to South Africa, a practise which violates international
law, but in effect demonstrates the reasons why the United States, United
Kingdom, and France will not take forceful action in the Security Coun-
cil against South Africa on the question of Namibia. The industrialisation-
liberalisation hypothesis voiced by Western investors seems chimerical,
since "the average daily prison population has skyrocketed from under
50,000 in 1958-1959 to over 88,000 in 1968-1969."^
With the changing composite realities of world politics today when
an American President can wine and dine with the Communists in Peking and
Moscow, the fear of Communism is no longer a tenable argument. But the
Government of South Africa sees the compelling necessity of the Western
World, especially the United States, to recognize its strategic position
as a bastion against Communist penetration into Africa. How important
Washington thinks South Africa's military role in the anti-communist
crusade today is difficult to determine, but it would not be surprising
still to find some cold warriors among the Pentagon Generals who have
30
considerable support for South Africa, as solid anti- communists.
The United States Navy uses, and participates in naval exercises
in South African bases of Cape Town and Durban. "In October 1959, ships
of the navies of the United States, France, Portugal and South Africa
^
Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg, February 20, 1970), p. 26.
in
The London Observer (May 19, 1974), p. 7.
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took part In ‘Operation Cape,' an anti-submarine training excercise held
off the southern coast of South Africa."-51 American naval units and
United States marines constantly carry out practice landings on the
coast with the cooperation of South African forces. United States mili-
tary technicians established a deep-space tracking station near
Krugersdorp, which is used to track the fall of ICBM missiles fired from
Cape Kennedy. This system is also used to track and communicate with
satellites. The United States is caught in an unfamiliar situation on
account of her pronouncements and commitments to democratic ideals; but
she needs to "contain communism;" the United States is prepared to fight
for these commitments, disastrous and wasteful though it is, although she
has been signing treaties of "relaxation of tension" with communist
countries.
Investment in apartheid, economic and military links with South
Africa are profitable to Japan, Western Europe and the United States,
who own the foreign investment which constitute the economic lifeline of
South Africa. As noted in previous chapters by the United Nations
Specialised Agencies, it is these economic ties which were responsible
throughout the sixties for the otiosity of the United Nations' decisions
to act against apartheid and against South African illegal occupation
forces in Namibia.
For almost half a century, South Africa has administered Namibia;
it has vitually no industry. Its economy is based on mining, agriculture,
31 Africa Today Pamphlet , No. 5., P« 22
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and fishing, which drain material wealth without replacing it with any-
thing. Its economic revenue cannot be separated from that of South
Africa because it is in fact administered as the fifth province of South
Africa.
84
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
%
The Security Council in 1972 determined that South Africa’s con-
tinued occupation of Namibia "creates conditions detrimental to the
maintenance of peace and security in the region." 1 However, it appears
that the Security Council is unwilling to take steps which follow inexor-
ably from the logic of its conclusion. If South Africa does in fact
occupy Namibia illegally, and does not indicate any intentions to withdraw
from the territory, it follows therefore that there is a "threat to inter-
national peace and security" calling for the invocation of Chapter VII
measures.
The General Assembly Resolution 2145 that terminated the Mandate
clearly indicated that Namibia had come "under direct responsibility of
the United Nations." Indeed, if the United Nations has proclaimed Namibia
as an International territory, it follows a fortiori that South Africa’s
illegal occupation is an act of aggression. Although, the world community
has tried to define the concept "aggression" since the Versailles peace
conference of 1919, but not until April of 1974 did a special committee
of the United Nations approve a definition of aggression to be submitted
for adoption by the General Assembly in September 1974. Articles 1, 2, 3
and 5 state that:
1) Aggression is the use of armed force by a state
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity
1
Res . 310, 1638th Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/310 (February 4, 1972).
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or political independence of another state
or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Charter of the United Nations, as set out
. in this definition.
2) The first use of armed force by a state in
contravention of the Charter shall constitute
prima facie evidence of an act of aggression,
although the Security Council may, in conform-
ity with the Charter, conclude that a deter-
mination that an act of aggression has been
committed would be justified in the light of
other relevant circumstances, including the
fact that the acts concerned or their conse-
quences are not of sufficient gravity.
3a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces
of a state of the territory of another state,
or any military occupation, however tempor-
ary, resulting from such invasion or attack,
or any annexation by the use of force of the
territory of another state or part thereof.
5) No consideration of whatever nature whether
political, economic, military or otherwise,
may serve as a justification for aggression.
A war of aggression is a crime against inter-
national peace. Aggression gives rise to
international responsibility.
No territorial acquisition or special advan-
tage resulting from aggression are or shall
be recognised as lawful.
^
But the reason for the failure of the Security Council to follow the logic
of its conclusion up till now is of course simple: Great Britain, France
and the United States, among others, have made it clear that they will not
support the application of Chapter VII measures or the use of force into
3
forcing South Africa to comply with United Nations Resolutions. It is
^
New York Times
,
April 11, 1974, p. 2.
3
UNSCOR, 1056th Meeting, 7 August, 1963, p. 6.
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time the world community recognized the realities of the situation in
Namibia. Under the present diplomatic imbroglio. South Africa is not
going to heed to the United Nations demands that it withdraw from Namibia,
and the Security Council is not going to apply military force on economic
sanctions to enforce its demands. Is there no way for the people of
Namibia to express their wishes for self-determination, if the United
Nations will not acknowledge its accountability to them?
The United Nations having failed to achieve substantial results
from confrontation and litigations, heeded to the suggestion of the
British Representative in the Security Council. It was suggested "that
4it is by dialogue rather than confrontation that progress can be achieved."
In effect a Resolution was passed by the Security Council urging the
Secretary-General to initiate as soon as possible contacts with the Union
Government, how Namibians can freely exercise their right to self-
determination.^ In September, 1972, Secretary-General Waldheim appointed
Alfred M. Escher, a retired Swiss diplomat, as his special representative.
South Africa refused Mr. Escher to open an office in Namibia though earl-
ier it indicated her willingness to accept a special United Nations repre-
sentative for consultation concerning the future of Namibia. ^ At the
end of the preliminary talk with South Africa on Namibia, the Secretary-
General Mr. Waldheim acknowledged "deep gulf" between the United Nations’
^26 U.N. SCOR, 1589th Meeting, U.N. Doc, s/pv 1589 at 32 (October
6, 1971).
^Security Council Res. 309, 168th Meeting U.N. Doc. S.Res. 309
(February 4, 1972).
^New York Times, September 26, 1972 P«: 6, col. 1.
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n
position and that of South Africa/ The dialogue was finally broken off
in 1973..
But meanwhile, American and other Western firms, being satisfied
with the stability in South Africa, which in fact they have helped to
create, are not using the South African market base for expanding into
gSouthern Africa. Over the past few years, Pretoria has gone out of
its way to help sustain the Rhodesian rebellion. Since the end of 1965,
when the Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of Independence was proclaimed,
South Africa has kept open trade channels, provided oil and lines of
credit, and filled Rhodesian needs which were foreclosed of first British,
9
and then United Nations, sanctions. Furthermore, South African armed
forces entered into Rhodesia to assist the Rhodesian forces to combat
guerillas in August 1967, and these troops have not been withdrawn.
South Africa's action is noteworthy because she has long defended her
apartheid policy in international forums by strictly interpreting Article
2 (7) of the United Nations Charter, which states "nothing contained in
the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state." With South Africa's forces in Rhodesia, which is a nominal
British colony, South Africa is prepared to direct its forces to fight
7Ibld . , March 11, 1972, at 2 col. 3 .
®Ruth First, The South African Connection (London: Maurice Temple
Smith, 1972), p. 271.
^Amry Vandenbosch, South Africa and the World (Lexington: University
Press of Kentucky, 1970), p. 151*
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against liberation forces in a territory outside her Jurisdiction. Vorster
once remarked that "we are prepared to fight terrorists wherever we are
•Howed to fight them: if a neighbour’s house is on fire you don't need
a treaty or an understanding to go and help that neighbour extinguish the
fire."^ South Africa with all its resources and connections is creating
a satellite in Southern Africa, as a buffer zone to protect its own
territory. South Africa has refused to acknowledge its international
accountability for Namibia because of the possibility that a neighbouring
Independent state might serve as a haven for guerilla forces fighting to
restore the basic human rights in South Africa.^-1 This is understandably
logical in the light of the exceedingly hostile attitude toward South
Africa of most other African States.
The inaction of the Security Council has incapacitated the United
Nations and perpetuated a deadlock in the Namibian case. If both sides
were flexible, it might be worthwhile for the United Nations and South
Africa to agree on an arrangement whereby South Africa would continue to
administer the territory, but with understanding that it would do so
under the United Nations supervision. Such an arrangement would enable
inhabitants of the territory, at the earliest possible date, to reach a
level of self-government sufficient to enable them to exercise the right
of self-determination — whether that exercise should reeult in complete
10
The New York Times , August 2, 1968, article by Lawrence Fellows.
^See United Nations Council for Namibia, Report , supra note 165 >
at 22 for a discussion of the activities of "liberation movement" in
Namibia.
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independence or in incorporation into South Africa. The policy of apar-
theid which is now carried on with relentless vigor and determination
should be eliminated during this interregnum because it is rightly said
to "amount to the organization of a society on the principles of slavery." 12
Before agreeing to independence for Namibia, South Africa would require
guarantees that the new state would not pose a threat to South Africa
and assurances that the lives and property of the white population of
90,000 would be protected. For its part, Namibia would wish to ensure
freedom of its territory from South African encroachment, and full partic-
ipation in the economic, social and political life of the country by its
non-white population. The interests of the world community can better be
served, and South Africa’s fear allayed, if Namibia is established as a
neutralised sovereign state like Switzerland, Neutralisation of Namibia
could manage, if not entirely avoid to stabilize the balance of power
rivalries and/or remove a state as a focal point of international rival-
ry. A neutralised Namibia could serve as a "buffer state" between
South Africa and hostile liberation forces of Angola, Mozambique, and
Rhodesia, and consequently diminish the possibilities of its becoming a
focal point of international conflict. Neutralisation, as distinguished
from a policy of neutrality, can be brought about only by treaty and not
by unilateral declaration. A treaty of neutralisation, in the interest
12
UNSC0R 19th year, Supp. Doc. S/5658 and Add. 1-3* para. 89 .
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of maximum efficacy, should include the warring primary antagonists in
the conflict over Namibia; i.e., the United Nations, South Africa, and
Namibia. Such a treaty also should include the superpowers as quarantors
because of the indisputable role which they might play in the survival
and durability of such an agreement.
As a neutralised state, Namibia would be required to abstain from
going to war except in self-defence, and to avoid policies and actions
which might involve it in hostility. In the event of an outbreak of war,
Namibia would be required to stay neutral in the strict and classic sense.
As a neutral state, it would have to refrain from joining an international
military action, whether under the segis of the United Nations or any
other international organisation. Such an agreement would be inimical
to the Pan-Africanists because control by the majority is the consumma-
tion of the ideals of Pan-Africanism. The Pan-Africanists believe that
to overthrow the government of either Rhodesia, Angola, or South Africa.
Namibia can be used effectively as a haven for guerilla activities be-
cause of easy accessibility to major targets of these colonial territor-
ies from Namibia.
At the same time, neutralisation does not imply demilitarisation,
because a neutralised state has not only the obligation but the right to
defend its neutrality. Namibia would be obliged to prevent incursion
into South Africa from her territory while South Africa would be under
the obligation not to violate Namibia’s neutral status. The United Na-
tions Organisation should establish a commission to oversee the mechanics
of the Treaty, to ensure that the terms of the Treaty are being followed.
Any Treaty of neutralisation for Namibia must also provide for a periodic
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review of its provisions, and meetings to consider revisions in the
treaty should be called at certain intervals. But most importantly, mod-
ification or abolition of the status of neutralisation should be precluded
except by the consent of all parties to the treaty, including Namibia.
South African apartheid policy must be eliminated to enable
greater equality of opportunity for all races, as development is depen-
dent on manpower skill and administrative competence. Measures to this
end might include: recognition and encouragement of black trade union
activity; payment of equal wages and wages reflecting reasonable rates
for the job; equal access to promotion and training facilities; full
and equal promotion for health insurance, transport, housing, and bene-
fits and services to both employees and dependents. The understanding
between South Africa and the United Nations must include the abrogation
on restrictions upon individual liberties of non-whites, such as the
Suppression of Communism Act, the Ninety Day Detection Law, the 180-Day
Detection Law, the Terrorism Act, and the forced resettlements of non-
whites in bantustans and area restrictions. If such an agreement can
be reached on the present status and procedures for future disposition
of Namibia, any hope by the South African ruling class of maintaining
the status quo and perpetuating apartheid policy in South Africa itself
in the future, will be reduced. South Africa as characterised by Jim
Hoagland is a "Civilisation in Conflict" because in the light of an
overwhelming black majority castrated by apartheid policy, it is dis-
putable how a small minority can continue to control the fates of a large
majority indefinitely. The point is that successful modification and at
least partial elimination of apartheid in Namibia will definitely induce
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South Africa to reconsider its own internal policies. If the Namibian
case is successful, the more enlightened and moderate elements of South
Africa might one day be greatly encouraged and strengthened to push for
similar reforms in South Africa itself, before the gathering momentum of
human destruction and bloodshed should explode.
The neutralisation of Namibia would be a victory for the forces
of decolonization, which have been active in the United Nations in the
past decade. It is incumbent upon the United Nations and the world com-
munity particularly the Great Powers to explore all possibilities of
resolving the problem of Namibia without violence. Any other course of
action is incompatible with the United Nations responsibilities for
maintaining international peace and security and promoting respect for
the principles of equal rights and self-determination for all peoples.
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Appendix I
ARTICLE 22 OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT
To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late
war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which for-
merly governed them and which are inhabited not yet able to stand by
themselves under the strenuous conditions that the well-being and
development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and
the securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied
in this Covenant.
2. The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that
the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations
who, by reason of their resources, their experience or their geograph-
ical position, can best undertake this responsibility, and who are
willing to accept it, and this tutelage should be exercised by them
as Mandatories on behalf of the League.
3. The character of the Mandate must differ according to the stage of
the development of the people, geographical situation of the terri-
tory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances.
4. Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have
reached a stage of development where their existence as independent
nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of
administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time
as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities
must be a principle consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.
5. Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a
stage that the Mandatory must be responsible for the administration
of the territory under the conditions which will guarantee freedom
of conscience and religion, subject only to the maintenance of pub-
lic order and morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave
trade, the arms traffic and the liquor traffic, and the prevention
of the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases
and of military training of the natives for other than police pur-
poses and the defence of the territory, and will also secure equal
opportunities for the trade and commerce of other members of the
League
.
6. There are territories, such as South West Africa and certain of the
South Pacific Islands, which, owing to the sparseness of their popu-
lation or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of
civilization, or their geographical contiguity to the Mandatory, and
other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the
Mandatory as integral portion of its territory, subject to the safe-
guards above mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population.
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7. In every case of Mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the Council
an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.
8. Th^ degree of authority, control or administration to be exercised
by the Mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the members
of the League, be explicitly defined in each case by the Council.
9. A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and examine
the annual reports of the Mandatories, and to advise the Council on
all matters relating to the observance of the mandates.
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Appendix II
THE MANDATE FOR SOUTH WEST AFRICA
The Council of the League of Nations,
Whereas by Article 19 of the treaty of peace with Germany, signed
at Versailles on 28th June, 1919, Germany renounced in favour of the
Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights over her overseas
possessions, including therein German South West Africa.
Whereas the Principal Allied and Associated Powers agreed that,
in accordance with Article 2, Part 1 (Covenant of the League of Nations)
of the said Treaty a Mandate should be conferred upon His Britanic Majesty
to be exercised on his behalf by the Government of the Union of South
Africa to administer the Territory aforementioned, and have proposed that
the Mandate should be formulated in the following terms, and,
Whereas His Britanic Majesty, for and on behalf of the Government
of the Union of South Africa has agreed to accept the Mandate in respect
of the said territory, and has undertaken to exercise it on behalf of the
League of Nations in accordance with the following provisions; and
Whereas, by the aforementioned Article 22, paragraph 8, it is pro-
vided that the degree of authority, control, or administration agreed upon
by the members of the League, shall be explicitly defined by the Council
of the League of Nations.
Confirming the said Mandate, defines its terms as follows:
Article 1
The territory over which a Mandate is conferred upon His Britanic
Majesty for and on behalf of the Government of the Union of South Africa
(hereinafter called the Mandatory) comprises the territory which formerly
constituted the German Protectorate of South West Africa.
Article 2
The Mandatory shall have full power of administration and legis-
lation over the territory subject to the present Mandate as an integral
portion of the Union of South Africa, and may apply the laws of the Union
of South Africa to the Territory, subject to such local modifications as
circumstances may require.
The Mandatory shall promote to the utmost the material and moral
well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the territory,
subject to the present Mandate.
Article 3
The Mandatory shall see that the slave trade is prohibited, and
that no forced labor is permitted except for essential public works and
services, and then only for adequate remuneration.
The Mandatory shall also see that the traffic in arms and ammuni-
tion is controlled in accordance with principles analogous to those laid
down in the Convention relating to the control of the arms traffic, signed
on 10th September, 1919, or in any convention amending the same.
The supply of intoxicating spirits and beverages to the natives
shall be prohibited.
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Article A
The military training of the natives, otherwise than for purposes
of internal police and local defence of the Territory, shall be prohibited.
Furthermore, no military or naval bases shall be established or fortifi-
cations erected in the Territory.
Article 5
Subject to the provisions of any local law for the maintenance of
public order and public morals, the Mandatory shall ensure in the Terri-
tory freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship
and shall allow all missionaries, nationals of any state, members of
the League of Nations, to enter into, travel, and reside in the Territory
for the purpose of prosecuting their calling.
Article 6
The Mandatory shall make to the Council of the League of Nations
an annual report to the satisfaction of the Council containing full infor-
mation with regard to the Territory, and indicating the measures taken
to carry out the obligations assumed under Articles 2, 3, A, and 5.
Article 7
The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required
for any modifications of the terms of the present Mandate.
The Mandatory agrees that, if any dispute whatever should arise
between the Mandatory and another member of the League of Nations relat-
ing to the interpretation of the application of the provisions of the
Mandate, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be
submitted to the Permanent Court of Justice, provided for by Article
1A of the Covenant of the League cf Nations.
The present declaration shall be deposited in the Archives of the
League of Nations. Certified copies shall be forwarded by the Secretary-
General of the League of Nations to all Powers Signatories of the Treaty
of Peace with Germany.
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Appendix III
UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, CHAPTER XII:
INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM, ARTICLES 75-80
1) Article 75
The United Nations shall establish under its authority an inter-
national trusteeship system for the administration and supervision of such
territories as may be placed thereunder by subsequent individual agree-
ments. These territories are hereinafter referred to as trust territor-
ies.
2) Article 76
The basic objectives of the trusteeship system, in accordance with
the purposes of the United Nations laid down in Article I of the present
Charter, shall be:
(a) to further international peace and security;
(b) to provide the political, economic, social and educational
advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories,
and their progressive development towards self-government
or independence as may be appropriate to the particular
circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the
freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as
may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement;
(c) to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion, and to encourage recognition;
(d) to ensure equal treatment in social, economic, and commercial
matters for all Members of the United Nations and their
nationals, and also equal treatment for the latter in the
administration of justice, without prejudice to the attain-
ment of the foregoing objectives and subject to the provi-
sions of Article 80.
3) Article 77
I. The trusteeship system shall apply to such territories in the
following categories as may be placed thereunder by means of trusteeship
agreements
:
(a) territories now held under mandate;
(b) territories which may be detached from enemy States as a
result of the Second World War; and
(c) territories voluntarily placed under the system by States
responsible for their administration.
II. It will be a matter for subsequent agreement as to which
territories in the foregoing categories will be brought under the trustee-
ship system and upon what terms.
4) Article 78
The trusteeship system shall not apply to territories which have
become Members of the United Nations, relationship among which shall be
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based on respect for the principle of sovereign equality.
5) Article 79
The terms of trusteeship for each territory to be placed under
the trusteeship system, including any alteration or amendment, shall be
agreed upon by the States directly concerned, including the mandatory
power in the case of territories held under mandate by a Member of the
United Nations, and shall be approved as provided for in Articles 83 and
85.
6) Article 80
I. Except as may be agreed upon in individual trusteeship agree-
ments, made under Articles 77, 79 and 81, placing each territory under
the trusteeship system, and until such agreements have been concluded,
nothing in this Chapter shall be construed in or itself to alter in any
manner the rights whatsoever of any States or any peoples or the terms
of existing international instruments to which Members of the United
Nations may respectively be parties.
II. Paragraph I of this Article shall not be interpreted as
giving grounds for delay or postponement of the negotiation and conclu-
sion of agreements for placing mandated and other territories under the
trusteeship system as provided for in Article 77.
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